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THE AMBIGUOUS INDEPENDENT AND
ADEQUATE STATE GROUND IN
CRIMINAL CASES: FEDERALISM ALONG
A MOBIUS STRIP
Thomas E. Baker*
In topology a Mobius strip is a one-sided surface formed by
holding one end of a rectangle fixed, rotating the opposite end 180
degrees, and joining the two ends. l In Supreme Court jurisdiction
the independent and adequate state ground doctrine forms a simi-
lar figure by joining, on one side, the power of the Court to revise
the judgments of state courts on issues of federal law with, on the
other side, the Court's lack of any general power to reexamine is-
sues of state law. Each figure has an inherent ambiguity. Both the
topological figure and the jurisdictional figure are the one-sided re-
sult of joining a two-sided figure with a twist. While the twist in
the former is a 180 degree rotation, the "twist" in the latter is our
federalism. My essay is about the ambiguity that yields such a ju-
risdictional figure.
Since the First Judiciary Act, state courts, including state su-
preme courts, have had either exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction
over most federal questions.2 For as long, the Supreme Court has
possessed the power to revise judgments of state courts on issues of
federallaw.3 The Court, however, long has rejected the view that
the existence of a federal question in a state case empowers it to
decide every question raised or even every federal question raised.
If the judgment rests on a nonfederal ground which is independe"nt
*Professor of Law, Texas Tech University. Florida State University, B.s., 1974; University
of Florida, J.D., 1977. On leave 1985-86, Judicial Fellow, Supreme Court of the United
States. This article was solicited, written, and accepted for publication before the author's
entry on duty. The views expressed here are those of the author alone.
I WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1450 (unabr. ed. 1981).
• See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN. D. SHAPIRO, & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECllSLER'S TUE FED-
ERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYsrEM 844-962 (2d ed. 1973 & Supp. 1981) [hereinnfter
cited as HART & WECHSLER]; C. WRIGHT. THE LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS § 17 (4th ed. 1983).
• Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
799
HeinOnline -- 19 Ga. L. Rev. 800 1984-1985
800 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:799
of the federal question in the case and which is adequate to sup-
port the judgment irrespective of the correctness of the state
court's resolution of the federal question, the Supreme Court will
stay its hand. This principle is something of a creation of judicial
will sounding in political philosophy and apparently screens the
Constitution and the jurisdictional statute.
The doctrinal twist comes in the application to a state court's
ambiguous judgment in which the federal and state grounds are
indistinct. The Supreme Court limns the important boundary be-
tween the state legal systems and the federal system by defining
the requisite independence and adequacy in such cases. My pur-
pose is not to provide still another general exegesis of the indepen-
dent and adequate state ground doctrine. A short summary will do.
I emphasize instead the difficult applications in criminal cases. Sig-
nificantly, the ascertainment and disposition of the ambiguously
grounded judgments took on a new methodology in 1983 in Michi-
gan v. Long.4 The measure of this new methodology must be taken
against principles of federal jurisdiction, federalism, constitutional
theory both federal and state, and the proper institutional role of
the Supreme Court. This is how I propose to analyze this Mobius
jurisdiction.
1. SUMMARY AND SOURCE
I resist the scholarly temptation to trace the independent and
adequate state ground doctrine back to the Rosetta Stone.G Justice
Jackson once proclaimed, "This Court from the time of its founda-
tion has adhered to the principle that it will not review judgments
of state courts that rest on adequate and independent state
grounds."6 My concern here is the general authority of the Su-
preme Court to decide if a state ground actually has been passed
• 462 U.S. 1032 (1983).
• See generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 2, ch. V; 12 J. MOORE, H. BENDIX, & B.
RINGLE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 1111 511.01-.02 (2d ed. 1982); M. REDISH, FEDERAL JURIS'
DICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 216·31 (1980); R. ROBERTSON & F.
KIRKHAM, JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 116·54 (R. Wolfson &
P. Kurland 2d ed. 1951); R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 230·45 (5th ed.
1978); 16 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, E. COOPER & E. GRESSMAN, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE §§ 4019·4032 (1977) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT & MILLER].
Throughout this discussion, I will emphasize the criminal application of the doctrine.
Much of what I say and many of my authorities will apply to state civil cases, as well.
e Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125 (1945).
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upon and to review the independence and adequacy of that ground
to support the state court's judgment.?
Basic policies of Supreme Court jurisdiction introduce the doc-
trine.s The Supreme Court does not have a plenary appellate
power to review state court decisions that involve only a question
of state law. The Court, however, is possessed of an ample power
to review state court decisions of federal questions. The supremacy
clause, of course, obliges state courts to adhere to the Constitution
and laws of the United States, that is, to decide federal questions
when properly presented. State court decisions which include both
state law questions and federal law questions occasion the exercise
of the independent and adequate state ground doctrine. In these
cases, Supreme Court review is precluded if the state law question
is independent and adequate to support the judgment regardless of
how the federal question is decided or if the state court has ap-
plied appropriate procedural reasons for not reaching the federal
question. These policies have led to "an intricate set of doctrines
designed to identify the circumstances in which the Court may su-
persede state court determinations of state law.u9
The doctrines cluster around the twin criteria of independence
and adequacy. These two criteria have been considered at different
times to be the same criterion,lo alternative criteria,11 and conjunc-
tive criteria.12 Today they must be considered distinct.13 They are
related theoretically: an independent state ground may be set
aside if deemed inadequate.14
First, the state ground must be independent;lli the state ground
must not be intertwined with or dependent upon a federal ques-
tion either explicitly or implicitly.16 Dependence, which calls for
7 Exercise of the authority to do so has been traced back to Chapman v. Goodnow's
Adm'r, 123 U.S. 540 (1887). See generally Hill, The Inadequate State Ground, 65 COLUM. L.
REv. 943, 954-55 nn.42-43 (1965) (tracing history of Court's authority).
8 See generally WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 5, §§ 4019-4032.
9 Id. § 4019, at 662.
10 See Moran v. Horskey, 178 U.S. 205, 215 (1900).
11 Giles v. Teasley, 193 U.S. 146, 160 (1904).
12 Enterprise Irrigation Dist. v. Farmers Mut. Canal Co., 243 U.S. 157, 164 (1917).
12 Note, The Untenable Nonfederal Ground in the Supreme Court, 74 HAR\'. L. Rf.:\'.
1375, 1382 (1961).
14 WRIGHT & Mrr.LER, supra note 5, § 4019 at 662.
1& See generally WRIGHT & M1u.ER, supra note 5, §§ 4023, 4029 (procedural grounds dis-
cussed in § 4023 and substantive grounds in § 4029).
18 See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983); Minnesotn v. National Tea Co.,
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the exercise of Supreme Court jurisdiction, connotes a relationship
between the state law question and the federal question such that
a change in the determination of the latter would necessarily result
in a change in the former.17 For example, if a state constitutional
provision has been interpreted by the state supreme court to com-
pel a result identical to a parallel federal constitutional provision,
the Supreme Court would exercise jurisdiction as if the dependent
state provision did not exist.18
Second, the state ground must be deemed adequate;10 the state
ground must be bona fide,2° broad enough to sustain the judgment
and to dispose of the case,21 and of sufficient significance to justify
the Supreme Court's declination to consider the federal issue.22
The Supreme Court will reach the federal question if the state
ground is inadequate, if it is untenable, and found to be without
any substantial basis.23
One last distinction must be made explicit. The independent
and adequate state ground doctrine has two isomers, one substan-
tive and the other procedural. Usually, the Supreme Court applies
the doctrine in situations in which the state court has decided two
substantive issues, one state and one federal. There is also a proce-
dural form. State procedural law always influences the way the
309 U.S. 551, 557 (1940).
17 See, e.g., Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, 133 (1945); Standard Oil
Co. v. Johnson, 316 U.S. 481, 483 (1942); State Tax Comm'n v. Van Cott, 306 U.S. 511, 514
(1939).
18 See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 652 n.4 (1979) (DEL. CONST. art. I, § 7 held sub-
stantially similar to fourth amendment). See generally Greene, Hybrid State Law in the
Federal Courts, 83 HARV. L. REV. 289 (1969) (touchstone is whether federal law is operative)•
.. See generally WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 5, § 4028.
20 See, e.g., Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255, 263 (1982) (state procedural rulcs must be
applied consistently, not just as a device for avoiding federal questions); Barr v. City of
Columbia, 378 U.S. 146, 149 (1964) (state procedural requirements not regularly followcd
cannot deprive the Court of review).
21 See, e.g., Abie State Bank v. Bryan, 282 U.S. 765, 776 (1931); Murdock v. City of Mem-
phis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 634 (1875).
22 See, e.g., Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 447 (1965); Davis v. Wechsler, 263 U.S. 22,
24-25 (1923).
23 See, e.g., Broad River Power Co. v. South Carolina ex rei. Daniel, 281 U.S. 537, 543
(1930); Ward v. Board of County Comm'rs, 253 U.S. 17, 22 (1920).
This principle is not unlike the requirement of a substantial federal question in appeals as
of right from state supreme courts. See generally Note, The Supreme Court Dismissal 01
State Court Appeals lor Want 01 a Substantial Federal Question, 15 CREIGIITON L. REV.
749 (1982) (considering the repercussions and question raised when the court dismisscs an
appeal for want of a substantial federal question).
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federal question is presented and perceived, at least subtly. The
doctrine has dramatic application in situations in which the state
court has refused even to consider a federal question because of a
failure to comply with a procedural requirement of state law. Fed-
eral questions, like other questions, must be raised in accordance
with state procedure, so long as the state procedure is itself consti-
tutional, independent, and adequate.2~
The modern doctrine permits the Supreme Court to set aside a
state ground that appears sufficiently broad to support the judg-
ment if it is deemed sufficiently inadequate, but the modern doc-
trine also obliges that the Court refrain from reviewing federal
questions actually decided by a state court if the state ground is
both independent and adequate. Why? How?
I might begin to answer the "why" question by identifying some
rationale for the doctrine. The Supreme Court has not explained
the doctrine's complicated rules in terms of modern federal juris-
diction, however. Theoretical underpinnings for the doctrine do ex-
ist and must be identified to appreciate the content of the inde-
pendence and adequacy requirements and to consider how the
ambiguously grounded decision should be handled. Some leading
commentators have ventured a summary rationale:
The basic propositions . . . are that the role of state law is
always subject to federal control; that the exist.ence of Su-
preme Court jurisdiction should not, of itself, alter the ordi-
nary balance between state and federal law; that when state
law applies, the existence of Supreme Court jurisdiction is not
alone enough to warrant redetermination of state law; that
Supreme Court jurisdiction to protect federal rights requires
distinction between state procedural grounds and state sub-
stantive grounds in an assessment of independence and ade-
quacy; that there is at best little room to reconsider state law
in order to avoid constitutional questions; that the commonly
offered advisory opinion rationale is both circular and misde-
.. See generally Hill, The Forfeiture of Constitutional Rights in Criminal Cases, 78
COLUM. L. REv. 1050, 1083·86 (1978) (analyzing the Court.'s disposition of State procedural
grounds in criminal cases); Wechsler, The Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court: Reflections on the Law and the Lagistics of Direct Reuiew, 34 WASIL & LEE L. REv.
1043, 1054 (1977) (advocat.ing the rule of review whether the issue of state law Wlls substan-
tive or procedural).
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scriptive; and that the attribution of jurisdictional force to
present doctrine is unnecessary in principle and occasionally
misleading in describing practice.25
It seems the "how" question is just as involved and the answer
equally indistinct. The mechanism authorizing or requiring the in-
dependent and adequate state ground doctrine may be considered
on three levels: constitutional, statutory, and prudential.
Of course, the Constitution does not explicitly authorize the Su-
preme Court to review state court decisions. And while it is un-
usual for a court of one sovereign to review the court of another
sovereign, "federalism itself is-or was when the Constitution was
adopted-an unusual system."26 Article III does list cases and con-
troversies within the judicial power of the United States and
within the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction without as-
signing them exclusively to the federal courts.27 The Supreme
Court's constitutional power to review a state court's holding on a
federal question is within the tautology of the supremacy clause
and is inherent in our federalism subject, of course, to congres-
sional empowerment.28 The Court's power to review the indepen-
dence and adequacy of the state law holding before reaching the
federal question is another matter. The Constitution does not re-
quire the doctrine. Authority to support the doctrine, however, has
been found in several places in the Constitution. The independent
2. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 5, § 4021, at 675. Consistent with this rationale, the
same authors venture a synthesis of the doctrine:
The Supreme Court retains jurisdiction and authority to determine whether federal
law should displace state law generally on a given matter; to determine whether there
is any possible outcome of a federal issue that would require a different result than
state grounds; and to determine the adequacy of state grounds that, if adequate,
would independently sustain the judgment. All of these questions may be so easily
determined that they do not require assertion of full jurisdiction to decide. Once it
has been concluded that federal law permits state law to control, and a controlling
basis for decision is found in state law, the state question will not be reexamined
further. Acceptance of the state basis for decision precludes any need to inquire into
the independent federal issues, and jurisdiction to decide them is denied. The major
difficulties emerge in seeking tests to measure both the independence and the ade-
quacy of the state grounds, not in understanding the reasons why state courts should
be afforded great leeway in shaping state law.
Id. § 4021, at 695-96.
2. C. WRIGHT, supra note 2, § 107, at 736.
211d.2. See infra notes 142-279 and accompanying text.
HeinOnline -- 19 Ga. L. Rev. 805 1984-1985
1985] AMBIGUOUS STATE GROUNDS 805
and adequate state ground doctrine may be authorized by the
supremacy clause. Jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction includes,
so the argument goes, the determination whether the state court
has given proper respect to the federal interest in deciding the
state law question.29 The argument is circular, however, as the fed-
eral interest is protected if the state interest adequately protects
the federal interest, and the Court's adequacy inquiry is rendered
merely derivative. The net effect is to regard the federal interest as
the only issue in the case.30 Due process is a second locus for con-
stitutional authority, at least when the state ground is proce-
dural.31 If the state procedure denies a fair opportunity to be heard
on the federal claim, allowing the result would violate procedural
due process.32 Finally, it has been suggested that the doctrine is
part of our "working constitution," those premises underlying our
constitutional schema which have always been.33
The important distinction to be made is that the doctrine is not
constitutionally required, although it has several possible constitu-
tional authorizations. From time to time, the debate finds its way
into the Court's opinions, but this distinction is not always made.3-C
Were the doctrine constitutionally required, the Court would be
without power ever to decide the federal question without first ex-
amining possible state grounds for the decision. Yet, it does. Fur-
thermore, pendent and ancillary jurisdictions define the outer lim-
its of article III far beyond such a requirement.311 The power is
2. NAACP v. Alabama ex rei. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288, 297 (1964); Ward v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 253 U.S. 17, 22 (1920).
20 Hill, supra note 7, at 959.
21 When the state ground is substantive, due process seems as inapt as substantive due
process generally. But see Hill, supra note 7, at 962.
22 See Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 354 (1964); Michel v. Louisilll1O, 350 U.s.
91, 96-100 (1955). See generally WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 5, § 4025, at 725-29 (due
process tests of adequacy); Hill, supra note 7 (exploring the doctrinal basis for the Court's
review).
33 Sandalow, Henry v. Mississippi and the Adequate State Ground: Proposals for a Re-
vised Doctrine, 1965 Sup. Ct. Rev. 187, 188-89; see also Hort, Foreu:ard: The Time Chart
of the Justices, 73 lIARv. L. REv. 64, 111 n.80 (1959).
24 See, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 466-67 (1963) (HorIon, J., dissentins); Herb v.
Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-26 (1945); Murdock v_ City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 WalI.) 590,
641 (1875) (Bradley, J., dissenting).
so Comment, Michigan v. Long: Presumptive Federal Appellate Jurisdiction Over State
Cases Containing Ambiguaus Grounds of Decision, 69 IOWA L. REv. 10Sl, 1087 n.66 (1964).
Of course, there are distinctions between the Court's appellote jurisdiction and the lower
courts' original jurisdiction.
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there.36 While the doctrine is within the constitutional contempla-
tion it is not compelled by article IIJ.37
The same can be said about the statutory basis of the doctrine.
The Supreme Court has always interpreted the Judiciary Act to
exclude jurisdiction to review state law grounds in state cases.38 It
is quite another principle, however, to decline to decide a federal
question because the case includes an independent and adequate
state ground. The statute, as interpreted, permits but does not re-
quire this deference. Indeed, the interpretation affording the Court
this discretion flies "in the face of statutory amendments that
seem to point the other way."39 The statute would seem to allow
the Court to decide the federal and state claim so long as a federal
question has been raised and presented within the case or contro-
versy.40 Thus, no more so than the Constitution does the statute
compel the Court to apply the doctrine.
The independent and adequate state ground doctrine is best ex-
plained on a prudential level. While neither constitutionally nor
statutorily required, the doctrine is a judicial creation crafted from
policies of prudent judicial administration and forged in the cruci-
ble of federalism.41 While the policy that the Supreme Court may
review state court decisions of federal questions is grounded in the
dual sovereignty of our federalism, the independent and adequate
3. Contra Galie & Galie, State Constitutional Guarantees and Supreme Court Re-
view: Justice Marshall's Proposal in Oregon v. Hass, 82 DICK. L. REV. 273, 282 (1978).
37 See generally WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 5, § 4020, at 669, § 4021, at 676·96.
38 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85·87 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1257
(1983». For the full text of the successive enactments, see R. ROBERTSON & F. KIRKHAM,
supra note 5, at 931-41 app. A. Their history is traced in HART & WECHLSLER, supra noto 2,
at 439-41; and WRIGHT & MILLER supra note 5, § 4006, at 543·53, § 4020, at 662-75.
3. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 5, § 4021, at 675. See generally Elison & NottikSim'
mons, Federalism and State Constitutions: The New Doctrine of Independent and Ade-
quate State Grounds, 45 MONT. L. REV. 177, 180·82 (1984) (discussion of statutory basis of
the Court's power to review). As a result, the Court has saved itself from having to unravel
the Gordian knot of the constitutionality of its discussion of state law. See Hart, The Rela-
tions Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 502·04 (1954).
40 Presumably, the state law decision by the federal court would only be the law of the
case and would not be binding on the state court, despite the supremacy clause, because of
tenth amendment limits and the state's own sovereignty in our federal system. See L. 'I'mDE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-32, at 120 (1978).
41 Of like dimension are the nonconstitutional prudential principles of standing doctrine,
such as the general rule against representative standing. See Valley Forge Christian College
v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472, 474·75
(1982).
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state ground limitation is only indirectly implicated.":! Best under-
stood, the doctrine is viewed as a policy of self-restraint, as a
power held back. Modern notions of federalism and judicial econ-
omy lie at its foundation."3 The Court chooses not to exercise a
power to decide the federal question based on important concerns
for federal jurisdiction, federalism, constitutional theory, and insti-
tutional role.
Perhaps the best indication that the doctrine is of a prudential
nature is the Court's experience with ascertaining and disposing of
the ambiguously grounded decision, a context in which the Court
has experimented with several approaches. Such judicial eA-peri-
mentation could not be possible if the doctrine were of a constitu-
tional or statutory nature and mandatory. In the ambiguously
grounded cases, too, the prudential concerns are in the forefront.
In a leading case, the Court explained:
It is important that this Court not indulge in needless disser-
tations on constitutional law. It is fundamental that state
courts be left free and unfettered by us in interpreting their
state constitutions. But it is equally important that ambigu-
ous or obscure adjudications by state courts do not stand as
barriers to a determination by this Court of the validity under
the Federal Constitution of state action.....
Surely the Court has the power to decide the federal questions in
such cases, if not the state law questions. The doctrine is not juris-
dictional in the sense of the power to decide; that bugaboo should
be laid to rest:U'
•• See Note, Supreme Court Disposition of State Decisions Involving Non-Federal Ques-
tions, 49 YALE L.J. 1463, 1463-64 (1940).
'3 See Note, State Constitutional Guarantees as Adequate State Ground: Supreme
Court Review and Problems of Federalism, 13 A1.1. CRItl. L. REv. 737, 761-62 (1976) [herein-
after cited as Note, State Constitutional Guarantees]; Note, Supreme Court Review of
State Court Decisions Involving Multiple Questions, 95 U. PA. L. REv. 764, 768 (1947)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Supreme Court Review]•
•• Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 557 (1940). See generallj' Note, Federal
Review of Ambiguous State Court Decisions-An Opportunity for Judicial Centralization,
27 VA. L. REv. 900 (1941) (analysis of Minnesota v. National Tea Co. and other nmbiguous
state decisions).
•• Seid, Schizoid Federalism, Supreme Court Power and Inadequate Adequate State
Ground Theory: Michigan v. Long, 18 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1, 45 (1984).
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II. ASCERTAINMENT AND DISPOSITION
The doctrine of the independent and adequate state ground has
proved difficult of discernment and troublesome in application for
as long as the Supreme Court has been reviewing state court deci-
sions.46 This has been so despite the fullness of the Court's juris-
dictional design and the historical length of its development con-
stitutionally, statutorily, and prudentially. The Court has found it
especially difficult to employ the doctrine in ambiguously grounded
decisions. The Court admitted its own confusion in Michigan u.
Long: "Although we have announced a number of principles in or-
der to help us determine whether various forms of references to
state law constitute adequate and independent state grounds, we
openly admit that we have thus far not developed a satisfying and
consistent approach for resolving this vexing issue."47 I next dis-
cuss some reasons for the difficulty and summarize the Long at-
tempt at solution.46
A. The Inevitability of Ambiguity
The adequate state ground doctrine has two stages of analy-
sis: ascertainment and disposition. In the first stage, the Supreme
Court takes the measure of the state ground to determine whether
the independence and adequacy requirements are satisfied. In the
second stage, the Court must enter a disposition, must grant or
deny the writ and must affirm, reverse, or vacate the state court
judgment. If the ascertainment shows clearly that the state court
judgment is not based on an independent and adequate state
ground, the disposition should include a straightforward decision
of the federal question. If the ascertainment shows clearly that the
state court judgment is based on an independent and adequate
state ground, the disposition should omit any decision on the mer-
its of the federal question. In the unusual case, however, when the
ascertainment is unclear, the disposition decision is likewise con-
<. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). For the view that this
famous case would not be reviewable under the modern doctrine, see G. GUNTHER, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 57 n.9 (11th ed. 1985).
<7 Long, 463 U.S. at 1038 (footnote omitted).
<. Ambiguity in Supreme Court jurisdiction is not limited to the independent and ade-
quate state ground doctrine. See Wilson v. Cook, 327 U.S. 474 (1946) (ambiguity between
appeal and certiorari); Honeyman v. Hanan, 300 U.S. 14 (1937) (ambiguity among multiple
federal questions). This essay is so limited however.
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fused. Logically, the dispositional choice is to treat the ambiguous
decision in one of three ways. First, the ambiguous decision could
be disposed of as if the state ground were not independent and
adequate. Second, the ambiguous decision could be disposed of as
if the state ground were independent and adequate. Third, the
Court could use a compromise, some third variety of disposition.
Throughout the history of the doctrine, the Court has used each of
these dispositional techniques. The vice to be found in the disposi-
tional history has been the ad hoc nature of selection of one dispo-
sition over the others. Even after Long, "there is no clear state-
ment of the considerations that lead the Court to choose one
response over another."49 As we shall see, Long made clear what
disposition will follow an ascertainment that the ground is ambigu-
ous: ambiguously grounded decisions will be treated as if the state
ground is not independent and adequate. The universe of state de-
cisions has been reorganized so that ambiguously grounded and
clearly inadequate or dependent decisions are grouped together at
the dispositional level, although, at least in theory they are distinct
at the ascertainment level. Difficulty in ascertainment remains,
however, for the Court must still draw a line between the clearly
state-grounded and ambiguously grounded categories and assign
•• WRIGHT & Mn.LER, supra note 5, § 4032, at 769 (footnote omitted).
The same authors list the various dispositional choices before discussing them:
State court litigation may be disposed of without any opinion to indicate the
grounds chosen by the state court. Even if an opinion is written, it mny not clearly
reveal whether decision was rested on independent state grounds. The Supreme
Court has employed a wide array of devices in responding to such uncertainties. The
strictest response is to invoke the rule that parties asserting its jurisdiction must es-
tablish that there was no independent and adequate state ground, and to dismiss the
case if uncertainty exists. Alternatively, the Court may choose to resolve the uncer-
tainty for itself, and to decide the federal questions if it infers that there was no
controlling state ground; at times this approach has been followed even in face of an
admission that independent state grounds may have controlled the state court deci-
sion. A third approach has been to refer to clarifying statements that the parties have
obtained from the state court. Beyond these older techniques, newer techniques have
developed that involve more complex interactions between the Supreme Court and
state courts. The most modest technique has been to grant a request of counsel that
the Supreme Court continue its proceedings in order that an application mny be
made to the state court for clarification. Beyond that, the Supreme Court may itself
take the lead in seeking clarification from the state court, even to the point of ,'acat-
ing the state judgment and remanding with a direct request for clarification.
Id. But ct. id. § 4032, at 439 (Supp. 1985) ("A clear approach to ascertaining the grounds of
state court decisions has been articulated in the 'plain statement' rule adopted in Michigan
v. Long.") (footnote omitted).
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decisions to them. That ascertainment function continues.
At the risk of regress, I suggest that this ascertainment of ambi-
guity is itself ambiguous. One might suggest, for example, that the
Court should ascertain and label ambiguous any state decision in
which there is a significant probability that the decision is based
on federal grounds. This would trigger a disposition as if the deci-
sion were clearly not independently and adequately based on state
law. The obvious difficulty is how to determine exactly how much
probability is significant for this purpose, a task to which the
Court is not equal if experience with the doctrine is any indica-
tion.IIO Ultimately, any configuration of the independent and ade-
quate state ground doctrine must be reduced to the Court's toler-
ance of ambiguity. The dispositional category, which after Long
includes both federally grounded and ambiguously grounded state
court decisions, waxes and wanes with the Court's tolerance for
ambiguity. If the tolerance is low the category is enlarged; if the
tolerance is high the category is diminished. The key to under-
standing the doctrine in these difficult applications is not in defin-
ing ambiguity but in taking the measure of the Court's tolerance of
ambiguity.
Just as the ambiguously grounded decision lies on a spectrum
between the clearly independent and adequately grounded deci-
sion, at one extreme, and the clearly dependent or inadequately
grounded decision, at the other extreme, so too are there relative
degrees of ambiguity in between. Ultimately, the Court must de-
cide if the state decision is too ambiguous to be the object of defer-
ence under the independent and adequate state ground doctrine. lU
Before Long, the Court matched the ascertained degree of ambigu-
ity with the disposition.1I2 Mter Long, there are fewer dispositional
O. Note, Supreme Court Treatment of State Court Cases Exhibiting Ambiguous Grounds
of Decision, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 822, 834 (1962).
o. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rei. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 455 (1958); Black v. Cutter
Labs, 351 U.S. 292, 298 (1956); see also Kramer, State Court Constitutional Decisionmak-
ing 1983 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 277, 285 n.34 (listing cases).
02 Under the pre-Long dispositional law, multiple dispositions corresponded to variations
in ambiguity. See supra note 49. When the state court expressly based the decision upon
two grounds, one federal and one state, the Court did not view if the state ground was
independent and adequate. Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210-11 (1935). When the
state court decision was placed solely on a state ground, but a federal ground was asserted,
the Court did not review as conclusive the failure to reach the federal ground and heard the
case if the state ground was inadequate. Wood v. Chesborough, 228 U.S. 672, 672-80 (1913).
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options, connoting a lower tolerance for ambiguity. Yet, ambiguity
still is inevitable.
On an ideal docket, the Court should first evaluate whether the
state ground jeopardizes the actual federal interest involved; sec-
ond, determine if the state court judgment furthered some sub-
stantive state policy or merely took advantage of the federal inter-
est; and third, conduct the appropriate supremacy clause and
preemption analyses.Ci3 Consider instead, the dilemma facing the
Court in the ambiguously grounded state court decision. lH Its own
subjective evaluation may be wrong no matter what disposition is
selected for the ascertained-as-ambiguous decision. If the Court in-
correctly exercises jurisdiction, the federalism canon of state court
autonomy over state law may be honored in the breach, at least
until the remand to the state court. If the Court incorrectly refuses
to exercise jurisdiction, the Court's institutional role as final arbi-
ter of federal law goes unperformed and federal law suffers in the
process. The Court's tolerance for ambiguity is that significant.
Furthermore, this dilemma often is not apparent but may be lurk-
ing in a case and found only with extraordinary effort and even
then may not present itself until after the filing of briefs on the
merits or after the oral argument.1I11
When both state law and federal questions were raised and the state court decided \\ithout
an opinion, the Court assumed that the decision was based on the state ground, but .....ent on
to determine adequacy and would review the inadequately based case rather than infer that
the state court proceeded on an inadequate basis. See Lynch v. New York ex rel. Pierson,
293 U.S. 52, 54 (1934). If the state court expressly based its judgment on a federal question,
it made no difference that the state court might have relied on an independent and ade-
quate state ground in the case. E.g., Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.s. 192, 197·98
(1944); Indiana ex rei. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 98-99 (1938).
63 L. TRmE, supra note 40, § 3·33, at 122 n.11. See generally Harmon & Helbrush, Robin·
son at Large in the Fifty States: A Continuation of the State Bills of Rights Debate in the
Search and Seizure Context, 5 Golden Gate L. Rev. I, 81·97 (1974) (procedure for deciding
whether to retain a state rule).
M See Note, Supreme Court Review, supra note 43, at 773.
os See SUP. Or. R. 34. Jurisdiction is to be addressed in the petition for certiorari and in
the jurisdictional statement. SUP. CT. R 15, 21. The focus there, however, is if a federal
question has been presented. Schleuter, Judicial Federalism and Supreme Court Review of
State Court Decisions: A Sensible Balance Emerges, 59 NOTRE DAME L. RE\'. 1079, 1037
n.49 (1984). The issue was first raised in Michigan v. Long at oral argument, obviously after
considerable effort had been expended on the merits by the parties and the Court. Id. at
1088 n.50 (citing Transcript of Oral Arugument at 30). Sometimes cases must be dismissed
after oral argument. SUP. CT. R 53. E.g., Florida v. Casal, 462 U.S. 637 (1983); Department
of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 380 U.S. 194 (1965).
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Ambiguity is inevitable. State courts will not do away with it on
their own accord and nothing the Supreme Court can say or do will
eliminate all ambiguity. Nor will the Justices inevitably agree on
when a state decision is ambiguous. From the state court perspec-
tive, ambiguously grounded decisions may result from any number
of causes, bad lawyering, deliberate obfuscation, incompetence,
negligent lapses, a decision with no opinion, or from some other
cause. Furthermore, I submit that some ambiguity is an inevitable
byproduct of the judicial decisionmaking process. Judicial expres-
sion in opinion writing generally has its own limits, but in difficult
cases dealing with complex issues the intellectual process is pecu-
liarly fleeting. 56 State court decisionmaking in a federal system is
complicated, sophisticated, and theoretical. From the Supreme
Court perspective, a state court opinion and judgment is not a
mere shibboleth to be pronounced one way to allow review and an-
other way to prohibit review. The Justices cannot be expected al-
ways to agree that the level of ambiguity is or is not tolerable in a
given case. To expect that would be to blink at the many strident
disagreements over the years at the ascertainment level of the in-
dependent and adequate state ground doctrine.li7 Ambiguity in-
heres in state judicial decisionmaking in a federal system. We can-
not expect a Supreme Court docket without this feature. Best
understood, as a prudential principle, the independent and ade-
quate state ground doctrine in its application to the ambiguously
grounded decision may be likened to a rheostat, varying the inten-
sity of Supreme Court review over the years in response to the
larger environment of federalism. Only by focusing narrowly on the
treatment of ambiguous decisions and, at once, by focusing broadly
on the Court's constitutional philosophy and sense of role can we
hope to penetrate the doctrine's inner workings.
B. The New Methodology of Michigan v. Long
Much already has been written about the Court's new methodol-
•• See Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms,
91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1262-63 (1978).
• 7 Court division on the application of the doctrine is something of a tradition that has
continued to the present day. E.g., Ponte v. Real, 105 S. Ct. 2192 (1985); Montana v. Jack-
son, 460 U.S. 1030 (1983); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979); Murdock v. City of
Memphis, 87 U.S. (10 Wall.) 590 (1874). See generally Annot., 59 L. Ed. 2d 924 (1980)
(collecting cases).
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ogy for ascertainment and disposition of ambiguously grounded
state decisions announced in Michigan u. Long. llB I mean to sum-
marize here the opinions within the framework of this essay only
so that I can assess the broader implications of the Court's new
approach.59
When faced with an ambiguously grounded state decision, the
Supreme Court traditionally has used four techniques:
(1) since the burden is on the party invoking the jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court to establish that that Court has juris-
diction, it may dismiss if its jurisdiction is ambiguous; (2) it
may vacate the judgment below and remand so that the state
court will have an opportunity to clarify what it has ruled; (3)
it may continue the case to give the parties an opportunity to
apply to the court below for clarification; or (4) if it considers
that any state ground that might be advanced for the decision
is insubstantial, or that the federal question seems necessarily
to have been decided, it may take jurisdiction and decide the
federal question.6o
Over the years leading up to Long, the Court had used all of these
techniques choosing among them on an ad hoc and largely unex-
plained basis.61 If the Court knew, it was not telling. The rest of us
were left to guess that the choice was "made on the basis of the
Court's perception of the importance of the federal interest in-
volved as well as its conception of appropriate federal/state court
relations."62
08 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). See, e.g., Collins, Plain Statements: The Supreme Court's New
Requirement, 70 ABA J. 92 (1984); Elison & NettikSimmons, supra note 39; Schleuter,
supra note 55; Seid, supra note 45; Welsh, Reconsidering the Constitutional Relationship
Between State and Federal Courts: A Critique of Michigan v. Long, 59 NOTnE DAME L.
REv. 1118 (1984); Comment, supra note 35; Comment, Michigan v. Long: The Supreme
Court Establishes Presumptive Jurisdiction over State Court Cases, 20 N. ENG. L. REv. 123
(1984-85).
• 9 See generally WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 5, § 4032, at 439-41 (Supp. 1985).
60 C. WRIGHT, supra note 2, § 107, at 752-53 (footnotes omitted).
•, See id. § 107, at 752-53 nn.95-98 (citing examples of each of the four categories). Expla-
nation for a given choice was rare and reasoned explanation virtually nonexistent. See De-
partnIent of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 380 U.S. 194, 200-01 (1965) (importance nnd wide-
spread interest in the case justified remand for clarification rather than dismissal); Note,
supra note 50, at 842.
•• Welsh, Whose Federalism?-The Burger Court's Treatment of State Civil Liberties
Judgments, 10 HAsTINGS CONST. L.Q. 819, 838 (1983). See supra text accompanying note 53.
HeinOnline -- 19 Ga. L. Rev. 814 1984-1985
814 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:799
In Long, the Supreme Court of Michigan had reversed a state
criminal conviction, holding that evidence seized from the defen-
dant's automobile should have been suppressed.63 In the state
court opinion, the state constitution was twice mentioned in a gen-
eral discussion of federal law under the incorporated fourth
amendment.64 The Supreme Court held that the state decision was
not independently and adequately grounded on Michigan constitu-
tional law6 1> and announced a new methodology for ascertaining
and disposing of ambiguously grounded state court decisions.oo
Justice O'Connor,67 speaking for the majority08 admitted that
the Court had "thus far not developed a satisfying and consistent
•• People v. Long, 413 Mich. 461, 473, 320 N.W.2d 866, 870 (1982), rev'd, 463 U.S. 1032
(1983).
.. The court cited the state and federal constitutions in a footnote. ld. at 471 n.4, 320
N.W.2d at 869 n.4. In its conclusion, the court wrote, "We hold, therefore, that the deputies'
search of the vehicle was proscribed by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution and art. I, § 11 of the Michigan Constitution." ld. at 472·73, 320 N.W.2d at 870.
•• Despite the Michigan court's conclusory assertion, supra note 64, the Supreme Court
performed its own evaluation of Michigan constitutional law. The Court's tolerance for am·
biguity seemed quite low, as its understanding of state law confirmed that the state ground
was neither independent nor adequate. Long, 463 U.S. at 1044 n.l0. In the process, the
Court appeared intolerant of the style of the Michigan Supreme Court's opinion. See supra
text accompanying note 60 (choice (4». Such legal differences are somewhat surprising. See
Collins, supra note 58, at 94. Compare People v. Long, 413 Mich. at 469, 320 N.W.2d at 868
("closed folding Browning knife") with Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. at 1036 ("large hunting
knife").
•• On the incorporated fourth amendment merits, the Court expanded the permissible
scope of a search under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), to allow a limited protective search
of a suspect's vehicle based on a reasonable belief that the suspect is dangerous and may
gain immediate access to a weapon. Long, 463 U.S. at 1049. The merits do not interest me
for noVi. See generally W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 3.8, at 183·84 (1985);
O'Neill, The Good, the Bad, and the Burger Court: Victims' Rights and a New Model of
Criminal Review, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 363 (1984); Note, Fourth Amend-
ment-Officer Safety and the Protective Automobile Search: An Expansion of the
Patdown Frisk, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1265 (1983).
• 7 There is a certain irony that Justice O'Connor, a former state court judge, would be
author of such an opinion. See infra note 139•
•• Five Justices approved of the new methodology. Justice Blackmun concurred, but reo
fused to join the ambiguous state ground holding seeing "little efficiency and an increased
danger of advisory opinions in the Court's new approach." Long, 463 U.s. at 1054 (Black.
mun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice Brennan, joined by
Justice Marshall, dissented from the incorporated fourth amendment holding and simply
announced his "agree[ment] that the Court has jurisdiction to decide this case." ld. at 1054
n.1 (Brennan, J. dissenting). Justice Stevens dissented from the majority's presumption of
dependence and inadequacy and would have imposed the opposite presumption. He also
urged that the discretionay docket was misused to review a state decision that upheld a
criminal defendant's federal rights. ld. at 1065 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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approach for resolving this vexing issue."69 No member of the
Court seemed willing to perpetuate the ad hoc approach.'1O The
Justices agreed on the need for a single, straightforward method of
ascertainment and disposition in ambiguously grounded state court
decisions. They disagreed, however, on the choice. Rejecting the ad
hoc approach meant that there were four possible uniform ap-
proaches: (1) undertaking an independent examination of state
law; (2) allowing for state court clarification by vacating or enter-
ing a continuance; (3) presuming that adequate state grounds are
not independent; (4) presuming that adequate state grounds are
independent. The majority chose the last approach, as the least
difficult.'1l Examining the state law was unsatisfactory because the
Court would be venturing into unfamiliar territory typically with-
out the parties' guidance. Vacation and continuance were rejected
because of inherent delay and inefficiency and especially because
of the burdensome consequences for state courts effectively to de-
termine the Court's jurisdiction. A presumption against the juris-
dictional predicate would have frustrated the important need for
uniformity.
Rejecting these approaches the Court announced a new method-
ology for ascertaining and disposing of ambiguously grounded state
decisions which assumes the jurisdictional predicate:
Accordingly, when, as in this case, a state court decision fairly
appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven
with the federal law, and when the adequacy and indepen-
dence of any possible state law ground is not clear from the
face of the opinion, we will accept as the most reasonable ex-
planation that the state court decided the case the way it did
because it believed that federal law required it to do 50.'12
This methodology truncates the ascertainment function. Now the
surface appearance of a dual basis is enough. Even so, "[flair ap-
pearances, primary reliance and interweaving are not self-applying
•• [d. at 1038.
70 [d. at 1039 (majority opinion); id. at 1066 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
71 [d. at 1040-4l.
72 [d. The new approach was anticipated by some commentators who divided over its
propriety. Compare Bice, Anderson and the Adequate State Ground, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 750
(1972) with Falk, Foreward to Note, The State Constitution: A More Than "Adequate"
Nonfederal Ground, 61 CALIF. L. REv. 273 (1973).
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concepts."73 Ambiguity of some degree is inherent and the Court's
application of these ascertainment measures still obliges the Court
to assess how much ambiguity it will tolerate. The state courts re-
main the authors of ambiguity. The Court proclaimed a rule of
plain statement that preserves the state courts' control through the
formal device of their expressly announcing independence and ade-
quacy.74 The Court imposed a new uniformity at the disposition
phase which equated the ambiguously grounded decision with the
inadequate or dependently grounded decision: Supreme Court re-
view follows either ascertainment. In pronouncing the new disposi-
tional rule, the Court admitted the rule-proving exception that
"[t]here may be certain circumstances in which clarification is nec-
essary or desirable, and we will not be foreclosed from taking the
appropriate action."7l> That qualification takes away from the
Court's announced effort at "doctrinal consistency" if that goal is
understood to mean a rigid single rule of disposition.76 Nor does
the qualification appear to be merely a meaningless editing conces-
sion to some opinion-joining Justice to hold a vote, although it
reads that way." The Court has acted since the Long decision to
vacate a state judgment and remand for clarification of the inde-
pendence and adequacy of a state ground.7s
Precedentially, the Long holding is consistent with the most sig-
nificant recent trend in the case law on independent and adequate
state grounds.79 The holding is the culmination of a rethinking
13 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 5, § 4032, at 440 (Supp. 1985).
,. The Court stated:
If a state court chooses merely to rely on federal precedents as it would on the prece-
dents of all other jurisdictions, then it need only make clear by a plain statement in
its judgment or opinion that the federal cases are being used only for the purpose of
guidance, and do not themselves compel the result that the court has reached.
Long, 463 U.S. at 1041.
" Id. at 1041 n.6.1. Justice O'Connor noted, "this ad hoc method of dealing with cases that involve possible
adequate and independent state grounds is antithetical to the doctrinal consistency that is
required when sensitive issues of federal-state relations are involved. Id. at 1039.
11 Justice Rehnquist revealed the true significance of footnotes in a recent interview. "I
used to think, you know, if there were an expression in a footnote in an opinion that I
disagreed with, that we're going to be stuck with that footnote for years. Well, it turns out
that any time five people decide that we're not stuck with the footnote, we're not stuck with
the footnote!" Jenkins, The Partisan: A Talk With Justice Rehnquist, N.Y. Times, Mar. 3,
1985, § 6 (Magazine, at 28, 31, col.2.)
,. Capital Cities Media, Inc. v. Toole, 104 S. Ct. 2144 (1984).
,. See generally Bamberger, Methodology for Raising State Constitutional Issues in RE-
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process that began in 1975.80 Over the last decade the Court pro-
gressively has expanded the scope of its jurisdiction over state de-
cisions by narrowing the independent and adequate state ground
category in application.81 Now theory conforms to practice.
Whether the theory withstands close scrutiny remains to be dis-
cussed. Long itself is short on theory. The rationale identified with
the doctrine, and which justified the new methodology, was limited
to "[r]espect for the independence of state courts" and the "avoid-
ance of rendering advisory opinions."82 Practice under the new rule
suggests its viability. In the three Terms since Long, the Court has
adhered to the new methodology of ascertainment and disposi-
tion.83 How much Supreme Court practice has changed remains
unclear, in part, from the inevitable uncertainty in the Court's as-
certainment and tolerance of ambiguity and from the hidden na-
ture of the Court's discretion over its docket.84 How much the re-
quirement of a plain statement will affect state courts also remains
to be seen. If nothing else, Long was the culmination of the 'Court's
frustration with the "un-methodology" of the old ad hoc approach.
Whether the new rule will be confirmed and justified remains to be
considered.85
ill A CRITIQUE OF THE NEW METHODOLOGY
In Michigan v. Long, the independent and adequate state
ground doctrine took on a new methodology of ascertainment and
CENT DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CONSlTUTIONAL LAw 291·96 (1985); Kramer, supra note 51, at
285-88 (tracing the trend of case law on independent and adequate state grounds).
80 See Oregon v. Hess, 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
81 The Court seems to have internalized a view that these cases are important review
vehicles, removing a deep barrier to its discretionary jurisdiction. See, e.g., South Dakota v.
Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983); Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667 (1982); Delaware v. Prouse,
440 U.S. 648 (1979); Zacchini v. Scripps·Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977); see
also Long, 463 U.S. at 1032 n.8. See generally Elison & NettickSimmons, supra note 39, at
193-95 (recent development of the doctrine of independent and adequate state grounds).
82 Long, 463 U.S. at 1040. See Schleuter, supra note 55, at 1089. See generally infra notes
182-279 and accompanying text.
.. E.g., Caldwell v. Mississippi, 105 S. Ct. 2633, 2638-39 (1985); Ohio v. Johnson, 104 S.
Ct. 2536, 2540 n.7 (1984); California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 997 n.7 (1983). See infra notes
182-279.
.. Both the process of certiorari and of appeal-selection for plenary review screen inquiry
into the application of the doctrine. WRIGHT & Mn.u:R, supra note 5, § 4032, at 441 (Supp.
1985).
.. [d.
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disposition in its application to ambiguously grounded decisions.
To be validated, that new methodology must be analyzed in terms
of the justifications for the prudential doctrine. I approach those
justifications seriatim under the rubrics of federal jurisdiction, fed-
eralism, constitutional theory, and institutional role. Justice
Frankfurter once explained how all these concerns lie behind the
questions of Supreme Court jurisdiction: "The law of the jurisdic-
tion of this Court raises problems of a highly technical nature. But
underlying their solution are matters of substance in the practical
working of our dual system and in the effective conduct of the bus-
iness of this Court."86
A. Federal Jurisdiction
General principles of federal jurisdiction are matters of first im-
portance under our Constitution, since federal courts are limited
courts of a limited sovereign.87 Before a federal court may decide a
case or controversy, the decision to act must be within the article
III empowerment and within some enabling act of Congress.88
From the beginning then, the party invoking the federal power
must affirmatively rebut a presumption against jurisdiction.89 At
first blush, the presumption in Michigan u. Long seems to violate
this basic policy.
• 8 Flournoy v. Wiener, 321 U.S. 253, 263-64 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)•
• 7 "Before a federal court exercises any governmental power, it has a duty to determine
its ovm jurisdiction to act." Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 653 (1982) (Stevens, J.,
concurring); see also Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 77 (1807) (Marshall, C.J.)
(tracing the sources of the Court's jurisdiction).
88 See Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. 453, 454, 8 How. 441, 442 (1850) (8tatute); Hodgson &
Thompson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303, 304 (1809) (Con8titution). See generally
Hill & Baker, Dam Federal Jurisdiction!, 32 EMORY L.J. 3, 3-7 (1983). Of course, the original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is unique to this jurisdictional sequence. See generally C.
WRIGHT, supra note 2, §§ 105-110, at 725-74 (overview of the courts orginal and appellate
jurisdiction). The equivalent effect is achieved in Supreme Court jurisdiction by a twist of
logic. Soon after the First Judiciary Act was passed, the Court ruled that the explicit statu-
tory definition of categories of its appellate jurisdiction created an implicit denial of other
categories not listed but possible under article III. This has been the rule since the Court's
ruling in Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 620 (1875): Durousseau v.
United States, 10 U.S. 307, 314, 6 Cranch 177, 180 (1810). See generally WRIGHT & MILLEIl,
supra note 5, § 4002.
• 0 Turner v. President of the Bank of N. Am., 4 U.s. (4 Dall.) 8 (1799); Wisecart v.
D'Auchy, 3 U.S. (3 Dall) 321 (1796). See generally C. WRIGHT, supra note 2, § 7, at 22·26. Of
course, the burden is on the petitioner or the appellant to establish the Court's jurisdiction.
See R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, supra note 5, § 1.15, at 36-38.
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The first point to be made is that the independent and adequate
state ground doctrine is not jurisdictional in the strictest sense.
Neither the Constitution nor the statute necessarily requires that
the doctrine be followed, as it is merely a prudential principle of
judicial creation for dealing with cases concededly within those two
jurisdictional empowerments.9Q Second, the Long Court does not
"presume" jurisdiction, although admittedly the majority and dis-
senting opinions were not too deftly phrased.91 The Court is not
presuming jurisdiction, but only that one predicate guiding the ex-
ercise of its jurisdiction, the absence of an adequate and indepen-
dent state ground, is satisfied. The predicate is merely a prudential
principle of the Court's discretionary power over its docket, con-
templated but not compelled by Constitution and by statute. The
Court itself has recognized that Long does not create a true pre-
sumption by creating and invoking the exception to remand to the
state court for clarification.92 Applying the Long rule only means
that there is one less reason for the Supreme Court to refrain from
reviewing the case.93 That is all.
90 The general concept that federal courts may decide state law questions is not the sub-
ject of debate, although the scope of the power has been the subject of much controversy in
such areas as pendent and ancillary jurisdiction, diversity, and the eleventh amendment.
See generally Baker, Federal Jurisdiction, 16 TEx. TEca L. REv. 145, 148-50, 167-79 (1985)
(broad survey). The idea that a federal court would decide a federal issue in a case despite
the inclusion of a state issue is all the more unremarkable.
91 In the text, the majority opinion used the term "assume": "[W]e merely assume that
there are no such grounds when it is not clear from the opinion itself that the state court
relied upon an adequate and independent state ground and when it fairly appears that the
state court rested its decision primarily on federal law." Long, 463 U.S. at 1042 (footnote
omitted). In the footnote to this statement, however, the majority invoked "certain pre-
sumptions in deciding jurisdictional issues." Id. at 1042 n.8. Justice Stevens, in his dissent,
repeatedly uses the terms "presumption" and "presumes." Id. at 1066-67, 1071 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). See Schleuter, supra note 55, at 1097.
92 See supra text accompanying notes 221-32. There is a problem with the timing of the
Long rule which operates simultaneously with the Court's decision to review. Once the
Court grants review, the assumption that an adequate and independent state ground is Inck-
ing will be all but impossible to rebut within the "four comers" of the state court opinion.
See Long, 463 U.S. at 1040-41; Comment, supra note 45, at 9-11.
93 But see Seid, supra note 45, at 9-11. The Long rule considers but one particular ingre-
dient in the proper jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to review state court decisions.
Others, for example, that the federal question must be substantial and that the judgment
must be final and decided by the highest state court, are beyond the scope of this essay. See
generally WRIGHT & Mn.LER, supra note 5, §§ 4001-4033, at 490-789. Other generol jus-
ticiability requirements, such as standing, likewise go unconsidered here. See Schleuter,
supra note 55, at 1097.
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The Long ruling also relied on the advisory opinion prohibi-
tion.94 This was unfortunate. At best, this rationale is incomplete
and inaccurate, although it has proved remarkably resilient in Su-
preme Court thinking.9 !> Properly understood, the ban on advisory
opinions is an incident of the separation of powers between the
coordinate federal branches.96 Review ·of state court judgments
does not implicate the concern for separated powers.97 The article
III "case or controversy" requirement obliges the Court to decide
real disputes between adverse parties on a concrete set of facts.
The doctrine of independent and adequate state grounds presup-
poses a case or controversy already decided by the state court.98 To
rely on the advisory opinion rationale is circular and does not com-
port with the Court's actual range of practice under the doctrine.99
The advisory opinion rationale has less currency in ambiguously
grounded decisions, which present state law and federal questions
in an adversarial setting in which a Supreme Court decision would
dispose of the judgment on review.loo In the ambiguous decisions,
the application of the doctrine is only akin to the ban on advisory
opinions. Should the Supreme Court decide the federal question
and reverse, on remand the state court could independently assert
the state law holding and issue a second judgment with the same
result as the first which, in turn, would be insulated from further
•• See Long, 463 U.S. at 1040, 1041. This is one area where the substantive and proco-
dural branches of the doctrine are very distinct. The advisory opinion rationale is used 8ub-
stantively but not procedurally. The procedural branch relies on the respect due tho integ.
rity of state procedure. Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 447 (1965). Long, of course, was a
substantive case.
•• E.g., Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 726 (1975) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Fay v. Noia,
372 U.S. 391, 465 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
•• See Baker, Constitutional Law, 27 Loy. L. REV. 80S, 814 (1981); Frankfurter, A Note on
Advisory Opinions, 37 HARV. L. REV. 1002, 1007 (1924).
• 7 Cf. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962) (justiciability doctrine is not a concern of
federal-state relations).
•• See Elison & NettikSimmons, supra note 39, at 201.
•• WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 5, § 4021, at 688-89, 692, 694. For example, Murdock v.
City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875), ruled that the federal question should be
answered before determining the questions of independence and adequacy. The reasoning
set forth in Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-26 (1945), the source of the modern advisory
opinion rationale, is simply wrong. How else can we explain the practice under the proce-
dural branch of the rule that allows Supreme Court review when the state court waives the
state procedural bar? WRIGHT & MILLER, supra, § 4021, at 694-95.
100 See Note, Supreme Court Review of State Court Decisions, 97 HARV. L. REV. 224, 225
n.12 (1983).
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Supreme Court review. The Supreme Court's holding would retro-
spectively become akin to an advisory opinion on the federal ques-
tion.lOI This sequence of the state court trumping with state law
has occurred throughout the history of the doctrine.lo2 Keep in
mind, however, that the independent and adequate state ground
doctrine is a prudential feature of the Court's jurisdiction to deter-
mine jurisdiction, accomplished within its discretionary control
over its docket. lo3 Understood in this context, the Long rule is an-
other example of the more general principle of self-restraint which
requires that the Court not indulge in needless dissertations on
constitutional law.lo", The Court has acknowledged that ambigu-
ously grounded decisions call for a particularly sensitive applica-
tion of this general principle. lOIS
,., See Galie & Galie, supra note 36, at 286 n.75; Schleuter, supra note 55, at 1109. Fol-
lowing much the same analysis, commentators sometimes analogize to the mootness doc-
trine. See Elison & NettikSimmons, supra note 39, at 201-202; Note, supra note 13, at 1379
n.2l. That doctrine serves as a constitutional reminder to the federal courts that they are
courts. See generally Hill & Baker, supra note 88, at 18.
'.2 Note, Mandatory Directions by Supreme Court to State Court Treated as Advisory
Where Deemed Infringing State Jurisdiction, 59 lIARv. L. REv. 132 (1945); see also infra
note 18l.
'.3 But cf. Seid, supra note 45, at 14, 18, 32 (accumulating principles into jurisdiction).
,.. See, e.g., Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 568-75 (1947) ("[T]his Court
has followed a policy of strict necessity in disposing of constitutional issues."); Spector Mo-
tor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105 (1944) ("ff there is one doctrine more deeply
rooted than any other in the process of constitutional adjudication, it is that we ought not to
pass on questions of constitutionality ... unless such adjudication is unavoidable."); Ash·
wander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (liThe
Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the rec-
ord, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of.");
Burton v. United States, 196 U.S. 283, 295 (1905) (lilt is not the habit of the court to decide
questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the cnse.").
See generally WRIGHT & Mn.LER, supra note 5, § 4021, at 675; Seid, supra note 45, at 49·50.
'.3 Justice Douglas stated:
It is important that this Court not indulge in needless dissertations on constitu-
tional law. It is fundamental that state courts be left free and unfettered by us in
interpreting their state constitutions. But it is equally important that ambiguous or
obscure adjudications by state courts do not stand as barriers to a determination by
this Court of the validity under the federal constitution of state action. Intelligent
exercise of our appellate powers compels us to ask for the elimination of the obscuri·
ties and ambiguities from the opinions in such cases. Only then can we nscertin
whether or not our jurisdiction to review should be invoked. Only by that procedure
can the responsibility for striking down or upholding state legislation be fairly placed.
For no other course assures that important federal issues, such as have been argued
here, will reach this Court for adjudication: that state courts will not be the final
arbiters of important issues under the federal constitution; and that we will not en·
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The Long methodology is something of a calculated risk. When
ambiguity is ascertained, the Court has chosen the dispositional
technique of deciding the federal question. This approach creates a
potential for more frequent state court trumping with state law.
One careful study found that the state courts trumped almost sixty
percent of the Court's decisions in initially ascertained ambigu-
ously grounded decisions. lOG
The Long rwe does not depart from the general principle of self-
restraint without justification. First, both the retroactive advisory
opinion concern and the narrower general reluctance to decide con-
stitutional questionsl07 are most relevant to selecting a proper dis-
position once the state ground has been ascertained to be indepen-
dent and adequate. Although admittedly intolerant of ambiguity,
Long is a rwe of ascertainment, a methodology for equating the
ambiguously grounded decision and the clearly inadequately or
dependently grounded decision. Second, far from being "needless,"
the Court's decision serves to affirm authoritatively a federal ques-
tion or remove it from the subsequent state court dispute. Such a
decision serves the state court system in the immediate case and
goes beyond to affect the persuasive impact of the preliminary
state decision of the federal question.lOS The Long approach af-
fords the Supreme Court ultimate control over the substantive fed-
eral law, which is coterminous with its jurisdiction.loo This rule of
ultimate control legitimates the Long departure from the general
approach to avoid deciding constitutional questions and makes it
appropriate to disregard prudential principles. Therefore, Long is
consistent with general principles of federal jurisdiction.
croach on the constitutional jurisdiction of the states. This is not a mere technical
rule nor a rule for our convenience. It touches the division of authority between state
courts and this Court and is of equal importance to each. Only by such explicitness
can the highest courts of the states and this Court keep within the bounds of their
respective jurisdictions.
Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 557 (1940).
lOG Welsh, supra note 62, at 847; see also infra note 181.
101 The distinction may be gleaned from Justice Brandeis' famous opinion in Ashwander
v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring); sec also
Rescue Army v. Muncipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 568-75 (1947).
108 Bice, supra note 72, at 765-66; see also Sandalow, supra note 33, at 197·98.
109 See generally Murphy, Supreme Court Review of Abstract State Court Decisions on
Federal Law: A Judiciability Analysis, 25 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 473 (1981) (exploring the
sources of the Supreme Court's power to adjudicate).
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Federalism "may mean all things to all people."llo What I mean
by it is the necessary accommodation required by our federal
structure of dual court systems, state and national. Aggrandize-
ment by federal courts of the responsibility and function of state
courts does just as much damage to the structure as any other im-
proper federal assumption of state sovereign power.11l The ques-
tion of how this structure of judicial federalism should be main-
tained is a political issue that has been debated throughout our
history. Our dual court system, made up of two complete and au-
tonomous systems, is "comprehensible only as a blueprint for con-
flict and confrontation, not for cooperation and deference."l12 This
is why the case law of federal jurisdiction suffers from an inherent
ambiguity.1l3 A line of venerable precedents glorifies the impor-
110 Baker, The History and Tradition of the Amount In Controversy Requirement: A
Proposal to "Up the Ante" in Diversity Jurisdiction, 102 F.R.D. 299, 317 (1984).
111 Diversity Jurisdiction, Multi-Party Litigation, Choice of Law in the Federal
Courts: Hearings on S. 1876 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machin-
ery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 95 (1971) (statement of H.
Wechsler); id. at 183 (statement of J. Moore).
Justice Black used the heartfelt phrase "our federalism":
This underlying reason for restraining [federal] courts of equity from interfering with
[state] criminal prosecutions is reinforced by an even more vital consideration, the
notion of "comity," that is, a proper respect for state functions, 11 recognition of the
fact that the entire country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and
a continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare best if the States
and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their sepa-
rate ways. This, perhaps for lack of a better and clearer way to describe it, is referred
to by many as "Our Federalism," and one familiar with the profound debates that.
ushered our Federal Constitution into existence is bound to respect those who remain
loyal to the ideals and dreams of "Our Federalism." The concept. does not. mean blind
deference to "States' Rights" any more than it means centralization of control over
every important issue in our National Government and its courts. The Framers re-
jected both these courses. What the concept does represent is 11 system in which there
is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and National Governments, and
in which the National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and pro-
tect federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in \':ays that will
not unduly interfere with the legitimate activites of the States. It should never be
forgotten that this slogan, "Our Federalism," born in the early struggling days of our
Union of States, occupies a highly important place in our Nation's history and its
future.
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44-45 (1971).
112 Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideol"g)', and Innovation,
22 WM. & MARy L. REv. 639, 682 (1981).
113 Field, The Uncertain Nature of Federal Jurisdiction, 22 Wr.t. & MARY L. REv. 683, 6S4
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tance of federal tribunals as the primary protectors of federal
rights; a second equally venerable line of precedents emphasizes
the same primary role for the state courts.114 The independent and
adequate state ground doctrine combines both of these, as con-
cerns for federalism lie at the heart of the doctrine.l1G The Long
methodology may be understood as the latest adjustment in this
tension consistent with the present Court's commitment to main-
taining the structure of our federalism.116
Different philosophies of federalism have held sway at different
times in our history.l17 Noting such shifts in philosophy helps our
understanding of the independent and adequate state ground doc-
trine. For present purposes, I will identify three philosophies of
federalism, labelled "dual," "cooperative," and "new."118
Dual federalism was the philosophy of the Framers who held
that "the federal government and the separate states constituted
two mutually exclusive systems of sovereignty, that both were su-
preme within their respective spheres, and that neither could exer-
cise its authority in such a way to intrude, even incidentally, upon
the sphere of sovereignty reserved to the other."119 It happens to
be my philosophy, as well. Register me a Madisonian.120 More sig-
nificantly, the philosophy of dual federalism continues to dominate
federal-state relations in the area of criminal law.121 The separate
(1981) (describing the structural ambiguity as a "schizophrenia").
114 Id. at 684-86.
110 "The [independent and adequate state ground] rule is a salutory one in view of the
different jurisdictions of the state courts and of this court. It leaves in both the full pleni.
tude of their powers." Adams v. Russel, 229 U.S. 353, 361 (1913); see also Minnesota v.
National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 557 (1940). See generally WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 5,
§ 4007, at 553.
"6 See Hellman, The Supreme Court, the National Law, and the Selection 01 Cases lor
the Plenary Docket, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 521, 598 (1983).
117 Federalism is related to constitutional theory. Our federal court system is a creature of
the Constitution, but in this section I mean to discuss structural assumptions and philoso.
phies in our dual court system which form the framework for constitutional development.
See inlra notes 142-81 and accompanying text.
116 See generally Wisdom, Foreward: The Ever-Whirling Wheels 01 American Federal-
ism, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1063 (1984) (broad overview).
"0 A. KELLY, W. HARBISON, & H. BELZ, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGINS AND
DEVELOPMENT 517 (6th ed. 1983).
120 See Cover, supra note 112, at 641; Hellman, supra note 116, at 583·84; Welsh, supra
note 62, at 833; see also Scheiber, Federalism and Legal Process: Historical and Contem·
porary Analysis 01 the American System, 14 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 663 (1980).
121 See Note, State Constitutional Guarantees, supra note 43, at 748.
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or dual sovereignty theory accounts for much of present day con-
stitutional criminal procedure.122 Dual federalism has not pursued
decentralization without regard for the dual responsibility of state
and federal courts. Within this structure, as will be discussed, the
federal courts build the floor and the state courts build the ceil-
ing.123 State courts cannot invoke federalism to diminish federal
constitutional rights. The Supreme Court cannot invoke federalism
to establish maximum guarantees for the states. These are the ba-
sic assumptions of dual federalism.
The independent and adequate state ground proceeds on these
same two assumptions. These dual assumptions create the doc-
trine's inherent ambiguity that we have been considering. Early in
the history of the doctrine, dismissal was used as the disposition
for ambiguously grounded decisions to afford the utmost autonomy
to the state courts.124 The Court in Long, of course, opted for the
opposite approach of presumptively reviewing all ambiguously
grounded state court decisions. The disposition announced there is
thus narrowed to the state decisions for which the ascertainment is
unclear. Intrusion into state court affairs will be rare and at the
same time minimal.125 Furthermore, the state court is given the op-
portunity for requiring deference to its plain statement. When that
122 In United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922), the Court stated: "We have here
two sovereignties deriving power from different sources, capable of dealing with the same
subject-matter within the same territory••.• Each government in determining what shnll
be an offense against its peace and dignity is exercising its own sovereignty, not that of the
other." See also Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959) (upheld federol prosecution
after state conviction for same crime); Bartkus v. illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959) (upheld state
conviction after federal acquittal for same crime); cf. Heath v. Alabama; No. 84-5555, slip
op. (U.S. Dec 3, 1985) (dual sovereignty between states).
123 See infra notes 142-181 and accompanying text. See generally Welsh, supra note 62,
at 833-34.
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to prescribe only the minimum that a state must
grant. It does not have the authority to establish the maximum. Although a state
court cannot expand a state provision to the point where it conflicts with a counter-
vailing federal right, short of such a collision the states have the power to enlarge
individual liberties as much as they deem appropriate.
Project Report, Toward an Activist Role for State Bills of Rights, 8 lIARv. C.R-CL. L. REv.
271, 285 (1973) (footnotes omitted).
12' Welsh, supra note 62, at 839-41; see also Wells, The Role of Comitj' in the lAw of
Federal Courts, 60 N.CL. REv. 59 (1981) (comity as a vague abstraction to shield the arbi-
trary assignment of cases between state and federal courts).
12. Schleuter, supra note 55, at 1096; see also Wechsler, supra note 24, at 1056; supra
notes 58-85 and accompanying text.
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plain statement is lacking, dual federalism allows the Supreme
Court to treat the decision as within its domain.
More recently, at least in noncriminal areas, "cooperative feder-
alism" has been a competing philosophy of our dual court struc-
ture. This philosophy views state and federal governments as com-
plementary parts of a single governmental process.126 The two
court systems are deemed but one system of justice to protect indi-
vidual freedom from government excess.127 This philosophy may be
blamed for the ad hoc approach to disposing of ambiguously
grounded decisions that ended with Long. Frequently, but not al-
ways, the Court would choose to remand for state court clarifica-
tion in ambiguously grounded decisions.128 The new rule's auto-
matic review disposition and low tolerance for ambiguity frustrate
this philosophy.129 The familiar metaphor of federalism that likens
states and state courts to laboratories is related to the cooperative
philosophy.130 Whether Long only allows state court experimenta-
tion that narrows individual rights, as some critics argue, remains
to be seen.131 It is important to note that the philosophy of dual
federalism encourages experimentation but also contemplates that
"experiments are sometimes unsuccessful."132 The Court did in-
voke the "important need for uniformity in federal law" in Long.lss
But dual federalism does afford the Supreme Court the last word
on federal questions. No one would quarrel with the Court's
steadfast position, reaffirmed in Long, that the Court must have
the last word on the independence and adequacy of the state
120 See Wright, The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations: Unique
Features and Policy Orientations, 25 PUB. An. REV. 193, 199 n.26 (1965).
127 Hart, supra note 39, at 489; see also Freund, Umpiring the Federal System, 54
COLUM. L. REV. 561 (1954); Note, Separating Myth from Reality in Federalism Deci-
sions: A Perspective of American Federalism-Past and Present, 35 VAND. L. REV. 161
(1982).
128See Welsh, supra note 62, at 843-46.
128 Recall that Long was a criminal case. See supra text accompanying notes 119·25.
130 The metaphor was used often by Justices Holmes and Brandeis and remains au cou-
rant, especially in criminal procedure. See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 376 (1972)
(criminal procedure); New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting); Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 344 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Cover,
supra note 112, at 672-73; Note, Of Laboratories and Liberties: State Court Protection of
Political and Civil Rights, 10 GAo L. REV. 533 (1976).
131 Welsh, supra note 62, at 856-59; see infra notes 182-279 and accompanying text.
132 Schleuter, supra note 55, at 1100.
133 Long, 463 U.S. at 1040; see Elison & NettikSimmons, supra note 39, at 205.
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ground.134
Most recently in criminal law, commentators have called for a
"new federalism," a philosophy about as satisfying to a dual feder-
alist like me as is the "new" Coke to a "classic" Coke lover.13G The
new federalism embraces a single goal that the individual right re-
ceive its most expansive reading, by either the Supreme Court es-
tablishing a higher "floor" or by the state supreme courts raising
the ceiling under state constitutions. It matters not which court
and which constitution, so long as the individual wins and the gov-
ernment loses. This philosophy would prefer an assumption of ade-
quacy and independence or an assumption of inadequacy and inde-
pendence by gauging the era's relative sympathies of the state
supreme courts and the Supreme Court to individual rights on the
merits.136 Measured against this philosophy, presumably, Long
made the wrong choice. Today, many of those who view federalism
this way believe ~hat the individual has more of a chance to win in
state supreme courts under state constitutions than in and under
their federal counterparts. Long is a clear rejection of this philoso-
phy.137 Under the Long approach, the decisionmaking responsibil-
ity is assigned on the basis of structural responsibility: state
courts decide state law and federal courts decide federal law; the
ambiguously grounded cases stay in the Supreme Court.
A related phenomenon is the current debate on the so-called
"parity" issue. The debate about whether federal judges are better
than state judges and hence dispense a juster justice presently
seems far from resolution, if one is possible.13s I decline to decide
13' The constitutional structure that honors state grounds that the Court finds adequate
and independent is a federalism analogue to the political question doctrine in the federal
structure of separated powers. Political questions are constitutionally beyond the power of
the Court, but the Court decides what is a political question. See Powell v. McCormack, 395
U.S. 486, 519 (1969).
135 See infra notes 142-279 and accompanying text.
13. See Welsh, supra note 62, at 843-48.
131 Wisdom, supra note 118, at 1069-72; see also Schleuter, supra note 55, nt 10S0. Justice
Stevens' dissent seems to embrace this view. See infra notes 246-77 and accompanying text.
136 See generally Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1105 (1977); Solimine
& Walker, Constitutional Litigation in Federal and State Courts: An Empirical Analysis
of Judicial Parity, 10 HAsTINGS CONST. L.Q. 213 (19&3). Some of the judges have partici-
pated in the debate. Cameron, Federal Reuiew, Finality of State Court Decisions, and a
Proposal for a National Court of Appeals-A State Judge's Solution to a Continuing
Problem, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REv. 545, 548-53; Wright, In Praise of State Courts: Confessions
of a Federal Judge, 11 HAsTINGS CONST. L.Q. 165 (1984).
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which I favor, federal judges or state judges. My problem is that I
respect both groups. The Long rule only tangentially enters the de-
bate. Federal judges, the Supreme Court Justices, are given the up-
per hand in disposing of ambiguously grounded decisions. But any
advantage may be ephemeral so long as the state judges have the
power to follow the plain statement requirement and clearly an-
nounce an independent and adequate state ground for their deci-
sion. That would insulate the judgment from any federal review.
Admittedly, the two faces of federalism may see Long differ-
ently. Indeed, Justice O'Connor, the author of Long, seems to have
viewed federal-state court relations differently from the state
bench than she does now.139 The plain statement rule places pres-
sure on state judges to expand criminal rights, if at all, under their
state constitutions under pain of suffering review and possible re-
versal under the federal Constitution. But the federal structure im-
poses that requirement. At the ascertainment level, Long seems to
signal a more intense surveillance of state court decisions of federal
139 As a state judge, she observed:
If our nation's bifurcated judicial system is to be retained, as I am sure it will be, it
is clear that we should strive to make both the federal and the state systems strong,
independent, and viable. State courts will undoubtedly continue in the future to liti-
gate federal constitutional questions. State judges in assuming office take an oath to
support the federal as well as the state constitution. State judges do in fact rise to the
occasion when given the responsibility and opportunity to do so. It is a step in the
right direction to defer to the state courts and give finality to their judgments on
federal constitutional questions where a full and fair adjudication has been given in
the state court.
O'Connor, Trends in the Relationship Between the Federal and State Courts from the
Perspective of a State Court Judge, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 801, 814-15 (1981).
Apparently her perspective changed on the federal bench, as foretold by a speech she
delivered in 1983:
There is a fine line, of course, between a state court holding that an action indepen-
dently violates both the State and Federal Constitutions, and holding that the State
Constitution is violated because the Federal Constitution is violated. Recently, thoro
has been a tendency for the Supreme Court to find no independent state ground and
to assert its power to review if it appears that both federal and state constitutional
provisions are cited by the state court, that the state cases generally follow the fed-
eral interpretation, and the state court does not clearly and expressly articulate its
separate reliance on independent state grounds.
The point of this discussion is to emphasize that, as state court judges, you have a
very real power to decide cases, whether they are civil or criminal, on state grounds
alone, if they exist, or to indicate clearly and expressly that the decision is alterna-
tively based on separate and independent grounds .•..
Address by Justice O'Connor, National Judicial College, Reno, Nevada (May 13, 1983),
quoted in Schleuter, supra note 55, at 1089 n.G3 (citations omitted).
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law.l4O At the dispositional level, Long shows greater deference to
state courts than the unpredictable ad hoc approach. From a prac-
tical assessment of federalism, the holding is another marginal de-
velopment.l41 As a matter of philosophy, however, Long goes far to
serve the classical approach that state courts must make their own
decisions under state law, and the opportunity to guarantee defer-
ence by the plain statement preserves that state court domain.
C. Constitutional Theory
The holding in Michigan v. Long has implications for our consti-
tutional theory, both federal and state. While I cannot possibly de-
scribe those theories in all their complexity, I hope to summarize
the relative significance for them of the independent and adequate
state ground doctrine and the Court's new methodology of ascer-
tainment and disposition in ambiguously grounded state decisions.
From these two vantages, the new methodology may be better
understood.l42
1. Federal Constitutional Theory. Everyone knows enough
about the incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the fourteenth
amendment due process so that I may merely invoke a context
within which to discuss the Long rule. loC3 I begin with the observa-
tion that twelve of the twenty-three rights in the first eight amend-
ments concern criminal procedure so that the doctrine of incorpo-
ration and the Long rule, for the most part, involve criminal issues.
Our federal constitutional theory obliges the Supreme Court to es-
tablish minimum federal values of individual rights. State courts,
of course, are free to provide greater protection. This shared re-
sponsibility gives rise to the familiar "floor" and "ceiling" meta-
phors.l44 The role of the federal court is to set the minimum. The
minimum established is the level of protection justifiably imposed
on the states by the Court's fourteenth amendment hocus pocus. It
is the sort of lowest common denominator affording "those mini-
mal historic safeguards for securing trial by reason . . . and below
14. Comment, supra note 35, at 1096.
141 See Monaghan, The Burger Court and "Our Federalism," 43 LAw & COl'o'TEMP. PnoBS.
39, 49 (Summer 1980).
142 See generally Welsh, supra note 62; Welsh, supra note 58.
14. See generally W. LAFAVE & J. IsRAEL, supra note 66, §§ 2.1-2.8, at 32·67 (1985).
... See supra note 123.
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which we reach what is really trial by force."14G The Supreme
Court, however, has obligated itself to protect values affirmatively
beyond some shock-the-conscience standard of due process.140 All
rights "fundamental to the American scheme of justice" apply to
the states.147 Once applied to the state, the scope of the right is the
same as the limit on the federal government.148 There is nothing
new here. The doctrine of the independent and adequate state
ground furthers the Supreme Court's constitutional primacy.
When a state court advances a federal justification for a judgment
as well as a state law justification, the Court may exercise a pru-
dential self-restraint if the state law justification is independent
and adequate. This self-restraint preserves the federal role of es-
tablishing the "floor." The Long rule for ambiguously grounded
decisions does not change the role of the Supreme Court. The rule
allows for greater surveillance of state court rationales, however,
which affects the role of the state supreme courts in developing
federal constitutional theory.
The role of the state supreme courts in federal constitutional
theory remains unclear.149 As we have seen, traditional theory
obliges them to accept the Supreme Court interpretations of mini-
mum federal guarantees and authorizes them to interpret their
state constitutions freely to set the state "ceiling" above the fed-
eral "floor."lCSO Uncertainty surrounds the state court role in inter-
... McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943). See Welsh, supra note 62, at 820
Il.7.
... See Rochin .v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952).
... See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968)•
... See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964). Admittedly, a few Justices have concluded
that the scope of the federal right is reduced in its application to the states, but their viow
never has commanded a majority. See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 366 (1972) (Pow-
ell, J., concurring); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 496 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring
and dissenting).
... See Peterkort, The Conflict Between State and Federal Constitutionally Guaranteed
Rights: A Problem of the Independent Interpretation of State Constitutions, 32 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 158 (1981).
". See, e.g., Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975); Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489
(1972); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 60-61 (1968); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62
(1967).
Criminal procedure has been a very active arena for this process. See generally Howard,
State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REV. 873,
891 (1976); Wilkes, The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure: State Court Evasion of
the Burger Court, 62 Ky. L.J. 421, 422 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Wilkes, The New Feder-
alism]; Wilkes, More on the New Federalism in Criminal Procedure, 63 Ky. L.J. 873 [horo-
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preting federal constitutional law, in establishing, or to pursue the
analogy, in resurfacing the "floor."llil Let me try to explain what is
at work here. At a telling juncture of her Long opinion, Justice
O'Connor noted that the vast bulk of criminal litigation occurs in
state courts which must apply incorporated federal constitutional
standards. Because state courts "necessarily create a considerable
body of 'federal law' in the process," she explained, the Supreme
Court "has become more interested in the application and develop-
ment of federal law by state courts."l1l2 The debate over the proper
role of the state courts in interpreting federal guarantees continues
until the present day. At issue is the propriety of the state courts
acting as the functional equivalent of a federal court.IlI3 If we think
about the interpretations of the Bill of Rights as a quasi-constitu-
tional "federal common law of liberties,"IIH the state courts are no
less competent than the Supreme Court to formulate federal doc-
trine based on the broad constitutional principles, lGG or so the ar-
gument goes. Some state courts have tried this. The Supreme
Court has rejected these efforts at imposing greater federal consti-
tutional restrictions on state government than those imposed by
the Supreme Court.IlI6 The state court must behave as a lower fed-
eral court, it cannot claim the same sovereign power over federal
law that it enjoys over state law. The Court has embraced a federal
constitutional law theory that insists "when a state court reviews
state [action] challenged as violative of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, it is not free to impose greater restrictions as a matter of
inafter cited as Wilkes, More on New Federalism]; Note, The Independent Application of
State Constitutional Provisions to Questions of Criminal Procedure, 62 MARQ. L. REv. 596
(1979).
... A related issue of state court role involves cases in which two federal liberties arc in
conflict and state constitutional law prefers one over the other. See Robins v. Pruneyard
Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 911-16, 592 P.2d 341, 348-51, 153 Col Rptr. 854, 861-64
(1979) (Richardson, J., dissenting), aff'd, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). That is wholly another article.
See Peterkort, supra note 149, at 172-79.
152 Long, 463 U.S. at 1042 n.8. But cf. supra note 77.
'"" See infra notes 142-81 and accompanying text. Compare M. REoISII, supra note 5, at
116 (functional equivalent position) with Welsh, supra note 58, at 1133-41 (divided sover-
eignties position).
'64 Monaghan, Forward: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARv. L. REv. I, 2·3 (1975).
,.. Antieau, Our Sometimes Injudicious Review, 50 GEO. L.J. 765, 782 (1962); Friendly,
The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedures, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 929, 954 (1965).
,.. See, e.g., California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 427·58 (1971); California v. Green, 399 U.s.
149, 153-64 (1970).
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federal constitutional law than this Court has imposed."lG7 The
real substantive difficulty with the Court's approach is that while
federal guarantees remain uniform they also remain a kind of low-
est common denominator.158 But that is the "floor" theory.
The new methodology in Michigan v. Long establishes how the
Supreme Court will supervise state court developments of federal
law. A state court cannot raise the federal "floor;" a state court
only can establish a higher state law "ceiling." During the halcyon
days of incorporation, the Court reversed state courts for results
falling below the federal minimum. During the present renaissance
of federalism, the Court reverses state courts for results that are
above the federal minimum unless they are independently and ad-
equately grounded in state law. Thus, federal constitutional theory
is served by the Long rule. lri9 Shifting Supreme Court majorities
have not changed the federal constitutional theory, despite chang-
ing allegiances among the justices.16o
2. State Constitutional Theory. I face a dilemma. For me to
consider Michigan v. Long only in terms of federal constitutional
theory would deny the federalism I so revere.161 On the other hand,
the prospect of discussing fifty disparate documents intimidates
me in the writing as much as I think it would intimidate my audi-
ence in the reading. My compromise is to begin with a few general-
izations, then to consider three types of relationships between fed-
eral and state constitutional law, and finally to conclude with an
assessment of state supreme court reaction to the Long
methodology.
Let me not count the ways state constitutions are different one
'01 Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 461 n.6 (1981). Commentators
remain undaunted by these holdings. See, e.g., Sager, supra note 56, at 1248.
,•• This was the reason for Justice Harlan's rejection of incorporation. See Williams v.
Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 118, 131 n.14 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting). See gener-
ally Welsh, supra note 62, at 865-68.
,.. Of course if the Court gets it wrong, the state court is always free to reassert an inde-
pendent and adequate state ground on remand. See infra note 180.
'6. Justice Brennan's view of this aspect of federal constitutional theory has changed over
the years. At one time he advocated a minor role for state constitutions and a primary role
for federal protections. Brennan, Some Aspects of Federalism, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 945, 955
(1964). More recently he has campaigned for state courts and state constitutions to assume
an ascendency in individual rights. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of In-
dividual Rights, 90 HARv. L. REV. 489 (1977). See infra text accompanying note 278.
'8' See Linde, E Pluribus-Constitutional Theory and State Courts, 18 GA. L. REV. 165
(1984).
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from the other and all from the federal. 162 State constitutions do
have some similarities worth mentioning.163 In the typical state
constitution, a declaration of rights is part of the document for-
mally and is a priority in the state constitutional philosophy. Vari-
ous rights are declared, some of which correspond to the federal
counterpart, some of which are unique. Many trace their lineage to
sources before the federal Bill of Rights. Frequently, the declara-
tion of rights includes some statement of political philosophy as
well. The emphasis is that identified fundamental rights are su-
preme over other sources of law as a matter of political and legal
philosophy.
There are three extant theories of the relationship between a
state constitution and the federal Constitution.UH First, the pri-
macy theory views the state constitution as the primary source of
individual rights and calls for analysis of state right claims before
considering claims under the Constitution. Under this view the
state court will reach the federal claim if, and only if, it denies the
state right claim. The primacy theory is supported by the history
that state constitutional protections applied to state actions long
before federal protections were incorporated. Federalism is served
by the theory in affording more stability in the face of federal
changes and greater state autonomy than under a national stan-
dard.165 Second, the supplemental theory views the state constitu-
tion as supplemental to the Constitution. Claims under the latter
are resolved before consideration of the former to determine if the
state constitution justifies a different result when the federal claim
'6' For a collection of recent articles on state constitutional law, see Abrohamson, Rein-
carnation of State Courts, 36 Sw. 1..J. 951, 972-74 (1982); Linde, First Things
First: Rediscovering the States' Bill of Rights, 9 U. BALT. 1.. REv. 379, 396 n.70 (l980);
Developments in the Law-The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HAR\'.1..
REV. 1324, 1328 n.20 (1982); see also Rebirth of Reliance on State Charters-A Fresh Laok
at Old Issues, Nat'l L.J., Mar. 12, 1984, at 25, coLl (bibliography).
'63 See generally Countryman, Why a State Bill of Rights?, 45 WASIL 1.. RE\'.454 (l970);
Mazor, Notes on a Bill of Rights in a State Constitution, 10 UTAH 1.. RE\'. 326 (l966).
,.. See generally Banlberger, supra note 79, at 301-06; see also Carson, "Last Things
Last": A Methodological Approach to Legal Argument in State Courts, 19 WlLLAMETl'E 1..
REV. 64 (1983).
'6' Linde, supra note 161, at 178-79; Linde, supra note 162, at 383-84; Williams, In the
Supreme Court's Shadow: Legitimacy of State Rejection of Supreme Court Reasoning
and Result, 35 S.CL. REv. 353, 377, 389·90 (l984); see, e.g., Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494
(Alaska 1975); State v. Cadman, 476 A.2d 1148 (Me. 1984); State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 471
A.2d 347 (1983).
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is unsuccessful. This approach is frequently justified by the prag-
matic admission of the recent federal dominance and depends on a
general notion of supremacy of federal law and on the idea of the
federal "floor."166 Third, the coequal theory views the state consti-
tution and the Constitution as simply coequal. Claims under both
are separately and independently considered and decided because,
according to the theory, both constitutions independently protect
rights.167
Beyond question, our constitutional history and theory justify
the independent existence of a body of state constitutionallaw.108
Chief Justice Burger made the point: "The 50 states cannot exer-
cise leadership in a national sense, but that does not mean they
should not be allowed the independence and freedom that was
plainly contemplated by the concept of federalism."loD The Court's
methodology in Michigan v. Long creates an imperative that the
state supreme courts confront their independent role under their
state charter. The rule's assumption for ambiguously grounded de-
cisions places the onus on the state court to choose a theory of
state constitutional law. The plain statement rule affords the state
court the means to make the choice explicit. The most difficult is-
sue facing state supreme courts under any of the three theories is
to articulate criteria for reaching a different result under a state
constitution than the Supreme Court has reached under the Con-
stitution.17O The Long methodology allows the state courts to do
that, but does not tell them how to decide.
By equating ambiguously grounded decisions with inadequate
and dependently state law grounded decisions, the Long Court
'66 Linde, supra note 161, at 177; Sedler, The State Constitutions and the Supplemental
Protection of Individual Rights, 16 U. TOL. L. REV. 465, 469·75 (1985); Wilkins, Judicial
Treatment of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights in Relation to Cognate Provision 01
the United States Constitution, 14 SUFFOLK UL. REV. 887, 889 (1980); Williams, supra noto
165, at 385-87; see, e.g., State v. Williams, 93 N.J. 39, 459 A.2d 641 (1983); People v. Mc-
Cray, 57 N.Y.2d 542, 443 N.E.2d 915, 457 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1982), cert. denied, 461 U.s. 961
(1983).
'67 Bamberger, supra note 79, at 304-05; Pollack, Adequate and Independent State
Grounds as a Means of Balancing the Federalist Judicial System, __ TEx. L. REV. __
(1985); see e.g., State v. Badger, 141 Vt. 430, 450 A.2d 336 (1982); State v. Coe, 101 Wash.
2d 364, 679 P.2d 353 (1984).
'66 See generally Linde, supra note 162, at 380; Sedler, supra note 166, at 475; Williams,
supra note 165, at 365.
'6. Burger, The Interdependence 01 Our Freedoms, 9 AKRON L. REV. 403, 406 (1976).
170 See generally Williams, supra note 165, at 385-404 (suggesting several such criteria).
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seemed to prefer the supplemental theory. The choice rejected in
Long, to equate the ambiguously grounded decision with the ade-
quate and independently state law grounded decisions, would have
favored the primacy theory. The coequal theory was rejected in
Long, by implication, by both the choice made and the choice re-
jected.l7l The primacy theory should yield few ambiguously
grounded decisions. The state constitutional question is first de-
cided and only when the assertion of the state right is rejected will
the state court reach the federal question. The supplemental the-
ory should yield some more ambiguously grounded decisions de-
pending on how the merits of the two claims are decided. For ex-
ample, when the federal issue is first decided in favor of the claim
and the argued state issue is not reached, the resulting decision
would have been ascertained as ambiguous and disposed of under
the ad hoc approach before Long. The new rule would call on the
Court to exercise review. The coequal theory should yield the most
ambiguously grounded decisions. When the state and federal
claims are reviewed and upheld separately, without more, the ef-
fect is a federal holding beyond the state amending process and a
state holding beyond further federal review.1'l2 After Long, such
cases should be reviewable by the Supreme Court.
The key to the Long analysis under these three theories of state
constitutional law is the requirement of a plain statement by a
state court when relying on state law. The state court may choose
any of the three theories. And, within any of the three theories of
state constitutional law, the state court may choose an adequate
and independent state ground. If the state court should choose to
rely on state law, how must that decision be cast? It is not clear,
for example, whether a state court may choose the primacy theory
in one opinion for all time or whether the independent and ade-
quate choice must be made express on a case-by-case basis.l'l3 The
decision in Michigan v. Long raises many questions for state courts
and for the Supreme Court alike, depending on how the Supreme
171 See Welsh, supra note 58, at 1120.
172 See Bice, supra note 72, at 756·57; Falk, supra note 72, at 281-82.
'7' See Collins, supra note 58, at 93. The commentators are divided. Compare Seid, supra
note 45, at 11 (suggesting boilerplate for each opinion) with Roberts, The Adequate and
Independent State Ground: Some Practical Considerations, 19 LAND & WATER 1.. Rgo,'.
647, 650 (1984) (suggesting that the Supreme Court reduce its workl03d by denying review
to state court decisions granting relief under federal law).
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Court interprets the plain statement requirement under each of
the different theories of state constitutional law.174 In a coequal
theory jurisdiction, the state court must always invoke the plain
statement rule to protect any state constitutional autonomy. If the
state court's efforts to comply with the plain statement rule are
well-received, the state court's choice between the primacy and
supplemental theories is less important. A niggardly approach to
finding that the plain statement requirement is satisfied, however,
might push state courts away from the supplemental theory and
toward the primacy theory.
Before leaving the subject of state constitutional law, I wish to
report a few preliminary observations on the state court experience
under the Long methodology. The immediate effect at the philo-
sophical level has not been very profound. Few state courts have
been moved to embrace formally one of the three theories of the
relationship of the state and federal constitutions. Instead, state
supreme court understandings may be grouped only inferentially
among the primacy theory/75 the supplemental theory,176 and the
coequal theory.177 The theories are not used with much precision.
Adherence or reliance on Long's plain statement corollary seems to
favor a case-by-case approach over the once-and-for-all announce-
ment.178 The form of the state court statement of independence
174 Pollock, supra note 167.
110 See, e.g., Cannaday v. State, 455 So. 2d 713 (Miss. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1209
(1985); State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226,471 A.2d 347 (1983); State v. Tapply, 124 N.H. 318, 470
A.2d 900 (1983); State v. Lowry, 295 Or. 337, 667 P.2d 996 (1983) (en bane)•
... See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 672 P.2d 255 (Mont. 1983); State v. Bruzzese, 94 N.J. 210,
463 A.2d 320 (1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1295 (1984).
177 See, e.g., State v. Ferrell, 191 Conn. 37, 463 A.2d 573 (1983); Krenzelak v. Krenzelak,
503 Pa. 373, 469 A.2d 987 (1983); In re T.R., 502 Pa. 165, 456 A.2d 642 (1983); Kearns-
Tribune Corp. v. Lewis, 685 P.2d 515 (Utah 1984); State v. Bartholemew, 101 Wash. 2d 631,
683 P.2d 1079 (1984); State v. Chrisman, 100 Wash. 2d 814, 676 P.2d 419 (1984) (en bane);
State v. Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d 686, 674 P.2d 1240 (1983).
118 See, e.g., Kenyon v. Hammer, 142 Ariz. 69, 688 P.2d 961 (1984) (equal protection);
State v. Binet, 192 Conn. 618, 473 A.2d 1200 (1984) (due process); State v. Tapply, 124 N.H.
318,470 A.2d 900 (1983) (self incrimination and search and seizure); State v. Coe, 101 Wash.
2d 364, 679 P.2d 353 (1984) (freedom of speech); State v. Chrisman, 100 Wash. 2d 814, 676
P.2d 419 (1984) (en bane) (search and seizure). But see State v. Lowry, 295 Or. 337, 667
P.2d 996 (1983) (en bane) (in the area of search and seizure Oregon courts will always en·
force Oregon law before turning to claims under the federal constitution).
On occasion, a state supreme court will "give-up" on a whole area of federal law, for
example, search and seizure. See, e.g., State v. Caraher, 293 Or. 741, 756, 653 P.2d 942, 950
(1982) (in the area of search and seizure "the citizens of Oregon are entitled to an analysis
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and adequacy does not seem critical so long as the explicitness re-
quirement is satisfied.179 While many state courts seem almost un-
affected by the Long holding, other courts have shown beginning
efforts of separating the state and federal grounds of decision
rather than suffer the risk of possible Supreme Court review. ISO Fi-
nally, it is clear that the independent and adequate state ground
doctrine remains a doctrine of state court last word. In several re-
cent decisions, the Supreme Court has reversed a state court deci-
sion apparently grounded on the federal Bill of Rights only to have
the state court reinstate its judgment under an otherwise compara-
ble provision in the state constitution.lSI To that extent, state
of the protections afforded by the Oregon Constitution independent. of the United States
Constitution."); Chrisman, 100 Wash. 2d at 818, 676 P.2d at 422 (complete rejection of fed·
eral court decisions in the area of search and seizure).
179 See, e.g., State v. Bolt, 142 Ariz. 260, 689 P.2d 519 (1984) (search and seizure); People
v. Hill, 37 Cal 3d 491, 691 P.2d 989, 209 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1984) (right. to a speedy trial);
Gaines v. Manson, 194 Conn. 510, 481 A.2d 1084 (1984) (right to a speed)' trial); People v.
Gonyea, 421 Mich. 462, 365 N.W.2d 136 (1984) (right to counsel); State \I. Ball, 124 N.H.
226, 471 A.2d 347 (1983) (search and seizure); State v. Von Bulow, 475 A.2d 995 (R.I), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 233 (1984) (search and seizure); Love v. State, 687 S.W.2d 469 (Tex. App.
1985) (warrantless arrest); State v. Chrisman, 100 Wash. 2d 814, 676 P.2d 419 (1984) (en
bane) (search and seizure).
180 See, e.g., State v. Cohane, 193 Conn. 474, 479 A.2d 763, cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 391
(1984); State v. Lowry, 295 Or. 337, 667 P.2d 996 (1983) (en bane); State v. Von Bulow, 475
A.2d 995 (R.I.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 233 (1984); State v. Chrisman, 100 Wash. 2d 814, 676
P.2d 419 (1984) (en bane). But see, e.g., In re Midland Publishing Co., 420 Mich. 148, 362
N.W.2d 580 (1984); State v. Jackson, 672 P.2d 255 (Mont. 1983); Brown \I. State, 657 S.W.2d
797 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (en bane). See generally Elison & NettikSimmons, supra note
39, at 210-12 (state court options after Michigan v. Long); Note, Camping on Adequate
State Grounds: California Ensures the Reality of Constitutional Ideals, 9 Sw. U.L. Rgo,'.
1157 (1977) (examining the rationale for doctrine that states are the ultimate expositors of
state law and the importance of its preservation).
181 See, e.g., People v. RanIos, 37 Cal. 3d 136, 150·59,207 Cal. Rptr. 800, 807-14, 659 P.2d
430, 437-44 (1984) (on remand, rejecting the Supreme Court's fifth amendment ruling in
California v. RanIos, 463 U.S. 992 (1983), based upon article I, § 7 and article I, § 15 of the
California Constitution), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2367 (1985); Commonwealth v. Upton, 394
Mass. 363, 370-73, 476 N.E.2d 548, 553·55 (1985) (on remand, rejecting the Supreme Court's
fourth amendment ruling in Massachusetts v. Upton, 104 S. Ct. 2085 (1985), based on article
14 of the declaration of rights of the Massachusetts Constitution); State v. NeviUe, 346
N.W.2d 425, 427-29 (S.D. 1984) (on remand, rejecting the Supreme Court.'s fifth amendment
ruling in South Dakota v. NeviUe, 459 U.S. 553 (1983), based upon article VI, § 9 of the
South Dakota Constitution); State v. Chrisman, 100 Wash. 2d 814, 817-22, 676 P.2d 419,
422-24 (1984) (en bane) (on remand, rejecting the Supreme Court's fourth amendment rul-
ing in Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1 (1982), based upon article I, § 7 of the Washing-
ton Constitution).
In the course of such a remand, the Supreme Court's opinion becomes retroactively ad\i-
sory. See supra notes 87-109 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court. has given us no
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courts seem undaunted by the new methodology.
D. The Role of the Supreme Court
That the Supreme Court of the United States does not have a
responsibility to review state court decisions of state law always
has been "a central fact of American federalism."182 That "the
Court as now constituted could not possibly discharge such a re-
sponsibility" will be accepted.183 The supremacy of federal law and
the Court's role as the Constitution's ultimate protector oblige the
Court to balance federal and state interests in "adjust[ing] the dis-
tribution of judicial power between the parts of our federalism."l84
In adjusting the independent and adequate state ground doctrine,
the Court must take the measure of this tension.
The Supreme Court qua appellate court necessarily participates
in the dual appellate functions of the correction of error (or pro-
nouncing correctness) in the case sub judice and the declaration of
law by creation, clarification, elaboration, or overruling.18G In the
former function, the governing legal principles are settled and the
question is whether the appeal presents a correct or incorrect ap-
plication. In the latter, the Court's emphasis is on the creation and
harmonization of legal principles.18s
Operating within these generalizations, the independent and ad-
equate state ground doctrine removes state law issues from Su-
preme Court review of the state court's interpretation of federal
indication whatsoever that state supreme courts are not the final arbiters of state constitu·
tionallaw within federal constitutional limits. Thus, the risk to the state court of the ambig.
uously decided decision remains low.
In any event, the litigator must be alert to preserve and to arrange state constitutional
issues to set the stage for state court review. See Commonwealth v. Sumerlin, 393 Mass. 127,
469 N.E.2d 826 (Mass. 1984); State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 557, 423 A.2d 615, 627 (1980),
appeal dismissed, 455 U.S. 100 (1982); Alderwood Assoes. v. Washington Envtl. Council, 96
Wash. 2d 230, 238, 635 P.2d 108, 113 (1981). Justice Pollack reads a great deal into the
denial of certiorari in State v. Von Bulow, 475 A.2d 955 (R.I.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 233 .
(1984), to conclude that a reasonably clear statement of independence will satisfy the Court.
Pollack, supra note 167.
182 Hart, supra note 39, at 499.
183 [d. at 499 n.26.
184 Note, Supreme Court Review, supra note 43, at 774 (footnote omitted).
18. P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, JUSTICE ON APPEAL 2·3 (1976) [hereinaf·
ter cited as P. CARRINGTON).
188 See generally Hellman, Error Correction, Lawmaking, and the Supreme Court's Ex·
ercise of Discretionary Review, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 795 (1983) (overview).
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law. When the state law and federal law in a particular case are the
respective constitutions, the significance of the ascertainment and
disposition methodology becomes dramatically evident.187 There
are three federal interests implicated which are not diminished by
the coincident state law issue which mayor may not place the
state judgment beyond the reach of the Court.188 First, even
though federal law does not alone support the state court judg-
ment, federal law should be applied correctly. Second, the Court is
the annointed final arbiter of the Constitution and bears some re-
sponsibility of interpretative leadership.189 Finally, the importance
of national uniformity in federal constitutional law must be consid-
ered. The state court's use of federal law implicates each of these.
The state court's interpretation of federal law may be incorrect.
The error may be advertent or inadvertent. Some commentators
have been concerned about the risk that state judges might effect a
purposeful ambiguity in grounding the decision both to evade Su-
preme Court review of the federal ground and to insulate the state
ground from the state political process.190 The propriety of error
correction within the independent and adequate state ground doc-
trine may be shaded by whether the case is on appeal from a crimi-
nal conviction.191 Two notions compete in criminal cases. One
views criminal cases as a category of disputes defining the relation-
ship of our government to us citizens. The other views them as
important government exercises to protect us all.19:! That there is
truth to each explains the failure of either view to prevail.193 Struc-
187 See supra note 105.
188 Note, State Constitutional Guarantees, supra note 43, at 747-55.
18' Recall Justice Jackson's famous aphorism: "There is no doubt that if there were a
super-Supreme Court, a substantial proportion of our reversals of state courts would also be
reversed. We are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are
finaL" Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
190 See supra note 172.
'" Cf. Hellman, supra note 186, at 800 n.34 (distinguishing civil from criminal proceed·
ings on direct review on the basis of the availability of federal habeas corpus review in the
latter).
,., See infra text accompanying notes 247-76.
,.3 But see O'Neill, supra note 66, at 386·87. The competing views and one accomooation
were offered by Justice Frankfurter:
It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have frequently
been forged in controversies involving not very nice people. And so, while we are
concerned here with a shabby defrauder, we must deal with his case in the context of
what are really the great themes expressed by the Fourth Anlendment.
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turally, the separation between the offense and the Court, over
time, distance, and function, serves to emphasize the general over
the particular view.194 The influence of the merits of the federal
question on the Court's application of the adequate and state
ground doctrine of discretionary jurisdiction is uncertain. Logic
dictates that the Court would evaluate its discretion to exercise ju-
risdiction first and the merits second. But experience with the doc-
trine over the years discloses examples of just the inverse ap-
proach.191> In part, this look ahead at the merits may be due to the
origins of the doctrine, during the era when the Court performed
the error-correcting function as well as the law-making function. loo
The need to correct federal errors in law still may be felt in the
immediate case, from the the likelihood or permissibility of suc-
cessful reprosecution in the specific case and from other potential
prosecutions which might contain similar claims. The state court's
erroneous application of federal law creates a precedential poten-
tial for more error in the deciding court's state and elsewhere.lo1
Today it must be conceded that the Court operates as a "Court of
Selected Error."198 When the demand for error correction over-
whelms, the Court responds to the particulars despite the more ap-
propriate emphasis on the law-making function. Generally, it
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
,•• Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7 (1956).
"The more remote the court, the easier it is to consider the case in terms of a hypothetical
defendant accused of crime, instead of a particular man whose guilt has been established."
Id.
,•• See Comment, Supreme Court Treatment of State Procedural Grounds Relied on in
State Courts to Preclude Decision of Federal Questions, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 255, 277 (1961).
,•• See Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875). In an 1832 diversity
suit the Court explained:
On all questions arising under the Constitution and laws of the Union, this Court
may exercise a revising power; and its decisions are final and obligatory on all other
judicial tribunals, state as well as federal. A state tribunal has a right to examine any
such questions and to determine them, but its decision must conform to that of the
Supreme Court, or the corrective power may be exercised. But the case is very differ-
ent where a question arises under a local law. The decision of this question, by the
highest judicial tribunal of a state, should be considered as final by this Court ••••
Green v. Neal's Lessee, 31 U.S. 235, 240, 6 Pet. 291, 298 (1832); see also Shelby v. Guy, 24
U.S. 160, 162, 11 Wheat. 361, 367 (1826) (fixed and received construction by a state in its
own courts, makes a part of the statute law).
,.7 Murphy, supra note 109, at 487.
I •• WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 5, § 4004, at 525.
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should not, but that it does is without dispute. IDD These instances
always are rife with disagreement about the propriety of the par-
ticular exercise.20o Of more concern for present purposes is the per-
ception by some Justices of the Court's "increasing frequency. . .
to disregard important differences" between state and federal
cases.201 Pure error correction is proper, if at all, only in federal
litigation in which the Supreme Court wields the power of the
court of last resort with full supervisory power. Something more
must justify error correction of state court decisions, as I already
have suggested. The Long methodology does not change this no-
tion of role.
A second federal interest present by virtue of the federal ques-
tion and still relevant despite the state law ground is the Supreme
Court's leadership role in maintaining doctrinal coherence in mat-
ters of national concern.202 By constitutional design and practical
dominance the Court is the final arbiter of federal constitutional
law.203 At this level, the Court, in a kind of common law role, re-
solves broad national issues having significance beyond the inter-
ests of the individual litigants by giving content to federal rights.
This role must be reconciled with the independent and adequate
,•• The most recent comprehensive study of the Court's jurisdiction concluded:
[C]ases in which a state court has invalidated state action on a,federal ground should
not be heard by the Court in the absence of a conflict or a decision to treat the case
as a vehicle for a major pronouncement of federal law. Without further percolation,
there is ordinarily little reason to believe that such an issue is one of recurring na·
tional significance; and correction of error, even regarding a matter of constitutional
law, is not a sufficient basis for Supreme Court intervention. Here, unlike a federal
court's invalidation of state action, structural justification for intervention is gener-
ally missing, given the absence of vertical federalism difficulties and the built·in as·
surance that state courts functioning under significant political constraints are not
likely lightly to invalidate state action even on federal grounds ••• [The Court]
should not grant. .•• merely to correct perceived error.
Estreicher & Sexton, New York University Supreme Court Project, Executive Summnr}' 22-
23 (1985) (as of this writing, the full report is still forthcoming); see also ide at 14.
'00 E.g., California v. Carney, 105 S. Ct. 2066, 2071-74 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
201 Florida V. Rodriquez, 105 S. Ct. 308, 311 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
'0' Note, State Constitutional Guarantees, supra note 43, at 757. See generall)' P. CAR·
RINGTON, supra note 185, at 100. Recall that the need for "doctrinal consistency" in the
Court's own jurisdiction was an important part of the rationale in Long itself. The Court
rejected the ad hoc ascertainment and disposition methodology to achieve this go:l1. Long,
463 U.S. at 1039.
'03 Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549 (1969) (against coordinate branches); Cooper
v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 17-19 (1958) (against state officials). See generally Schauer, Refining
the Lawmaking Function of the Supreme Court, 17 JL. REFORM I, 8-9 (1983).
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state ground doctrine.204 The doctrine effectively reduces the pool
of cases that the Court may use to guide lower federal courts and
state courts.205 When this reduction serves important interests in
federalism, the lost opportunity for leadership is offset. The Long
methodology of ascertainment recognizes that the opportunity for
doctrinal coherence is not to be given up without some such justifi-
cation. A state court cannot invoke comity and federalism to de-
fend an erroneously decided federal question. When there is an in-
dependent and adequate state law ground, that is reason enough.
In ambiguously grounded decisions, however, the rule anticipates
Court review. There is no clear justification for restraint. The
Court has evolved beyond a common law role of deciding a lawsuit
toward a role as leader of federal law in state and federal court
alike. Federal rights are to be vindicated in state courts and lower
federal courts, with the Supreme Court acting the role of super-
intendant. Any lesser requirement would jeopardize the Court's es-
sential leadership role in matters of federal law, a role the Court
must guard jealously.206 A less demanding standard less rigorously
applied would forfeit the Court's control over doctrinal
coherence.207
The danger toward the other extreme is resolved by the Court's
plain-statement rule. The Supreme Court's federal pronounce-
ments have a significant side effect on state constitutional law, an
area in which the constitutional design forbids a leadership role.
Supreme Court pronouncements limiting federal guarantees do
have an impact on state court innovation. On the part of many
state judges "[t]here is a reluctance to depart from Court rulings
limiting rights and a greater reluctance to consider novel ap-
.04 See Note, State Constitutional Guarantees, supra note 43, at 757.
'0' See supra notes 58-85 and accompanying text.
• 06 See Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and the When, 82 YALE L.J.
1363 (1973); cf. Wilkes, The New Federalism, supra note 150, at 446 ("There may be reason
to believe that evasive actions by state courts will deprive the Supreme Court of opportuni.
ties to decide important questions concerning the extent of the federal rights of the
accused.").
'07 G. GUNTHER, supra note 46, at 58 n.10; see also Elison & NettikSimmons, supra note
39, at 212-13. The Court seems to be reaching out to decide issues, in part, out of a concern
that a second chance may not present itself. The state court may use the state constitution
to prevent an after-remand decision on the federal issue. This is part of the Court's matur·
ing in its leadership role. Cf. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (similar
approach in finality doctrine). See generally Fiss, Foreward: The Forms of Justice, 93
HARV. L. REV. 1, 29-30 (1979).
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proaches once the Court has issued its view of the matter.":lOB Such
leadership is noncoercive, however, as the Court's federal holdings
are merely persuasive authority. The state judges choose whether
to be persuaded. Most commonly, this happens when the state
judges have interpreted a provision of their state charter to be co-
incident with a federal counterpart.209 The Long rule presents the
state court with the option of following the federal lead and choos-
ing dependence and review, or refusing to follow by a plain state-
ment and insulating their judgment.21o
The third federal interest present even in the independently and
adequately state law grounded decision is uniformity.:!ll Indeed,
the need for uniform interpretation of federal law was considered
of such primary importance as to justify the single expansion of
'08 Welsh, supra note 62, at 836. The California Court of Appeals noted:
Decisions of the United States Supreme Court construing constitutional phraseology
are highly persuasive ..•. By the nature of federal and state jurisdiction that court
has acquired a degree of expertise not shared by any state court. .•• The more courts
feel free to adopt ground rules unpersuaded by contrary decisions of other courts, the
greater the likelihood there is of uncertainty in those ground rules. The uncertainty is
mitigated if proper deference is paid United States Supreme Court holdings.
People v. Norman, 112 Cal Rptr. 43, 48-49 (1974), superseded 14 Cal. 3d 929, 538 P.2d 237,
123 Cal Rptr. 109 (1975).
'09 The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas did just this in Brown v. Texas, 657 S.W.2d
797 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983); Judges Clinton and Teague were not terribly persuaded.
Merely to parrot opinions of the Supreme Court of the United States interpreting
the Fourth Amendment is to denigrate the special importance our TlWIJl forebearers
attached to their rights to privacy and other guarantees vouchsafed by the Bill of
Rights they first declared and then insisted on retaining in every successive
constitution.
[d. at 807 (Clinton, J., concurring).
To the plurality's implicit holding that the members of this Court now have the
role of being nothing more than mimicking court jesters of the Supreme Court of the
United States, taps should be blown, and flags flown at half·mast-on behalf of what
was formerly a Court that was a part of the independent appellate judiciary of the
State of Texas.
[d. at 810 (Teague, J., dissenting).
"0 While the dependency option exists in each of the three philosophies on state constitu-
tional law, the likelihood of following the federal lead seems to increase as you move from
the primacy theory to the supplemental theory to the coequal theory. See State v. Lowry,
295 Or. 337,667 P.2d 996 (1983) (en banc)(primacy); Brown v. Texas, 657 S.W.2d 797 (Tax.
Crim. App. 1983) (supplemental); State v. Chrisman, 100 Wash. 2d 814, 676 P.2d 419 (1984)
(en banc) (coequal).
There also are occasions of Supreme Court Justices trying too hard to lead. See Colorado
v. Nunez, 104 S. Ct. 1257 (1984) (White, J., concurring); Florida v. Casnl, 462 U.s. 637, 637·
39 (1983) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
'" See Note, State Constitutional Guarantees, supra note 43, at 755.
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Supreme Court jurisdiction in the history of the Republic.212 Uni-
formity, however, is but a means to an end and not an end in itself.
Principles of federalism "call upon a people to achieve a unity suf-
ficient to resist their common perils and advance their common
welfare, without undue sacrifice of their diversities and the creative
energies to which diversity gives rise."213 The Court recognized this
need for uniformity in federal constitutional law in Long214 and
buttressed that need with a concern to protect nonjudicial state
officials from untoward state court pronouncements of federal
law.21lS While the goal of uniformity underlies the entire jurisdic-
tion of the Supreme Court over state court decisions, how much
uniformity is possible is another question.2lG The problem is that
the Court's capacity to achieve complete uniformity, if ever possi-
212 In 1914, Congress expanded the jurisdictional statute to include state decisions up-
holding federal law, for the express purpose of imposing uniformity. Act of Dec. 23, 1914, ch,
2, 38 Stat. 790. See F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COUIlT, A
STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 193-98 (1928); Note, Wider Jurisdiction lor thc
United States Supreme Court, 28 HARV. L. REV. 408 (1915).
213 Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954)•
... Justice O'Connor noted:
[I]t cannot be doubted that there is an important need for uniformity in federal law,
and that this need goes unsatisfied when we fail to review an opinion that rests pri.
marily upon federal grounds and where the independence of an alleged state ground
is not apparent from the four corners of the opinion.
Long, 463 U.S. at 1040.
... Id. at 1042 n.8.
216 The need for uniformity featured prominently in the decision upholding the Court's
power over the state judiciaries:
A motive of another kind, perfectly compatible with the most sincere respect for state
tribunals, might induce the grant of appellate power over their decisions. That motive
is the importance, and even necessity of uniformity of decisions throughout the whole
United States, upon all subjects within the purview of the constitution. Judges of
equal learning and integrity, in different states, might differently interpret a statute,
or a treaty of the United States, or even the constitution itself. If there were no revis-
ing authority to control these jarring and discordant judgments, and harmonize them
into uniformity, the laws, the treaties, and the constitution of the United States
would be different in different states, and might, perhaps, never have precisely the
same construction, obligation, or efficacy, in any two states. The public mischiefs that
would attend such a state of things would be truly deplorable; and it cannot be be-
lieved that they could have escaped the enlightened convention which formed the
constitution. What, indeed, might then have been only prophecy, has noW become
fact; and the appellate jurisdiction must continue to be the only adequate remedy for
such evils.
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347-48 (l816) (emphasis added); see also
Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 631-32 (1874).
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ble, surely today is overwhelmed. The hegemony of the Court over
the thirteen courts of appeals in federal questions is too attenuated
to achieve complete unity.217 The fifty state supreme courts make
inevitable some balkanization of the Constitution. Complete uni-
formity would include correction of every error, and as we have
seen, that effort is beyond the Court's capacity and institutional
role. Uniformity then becomes a relative goal. During the incorpo-
ration debate some justices even questioned the need for uniform-
ity for federal questions in the state courts. That view proved too
tolerant of diversity to suit the majority as a matter of federal con-
stitutional theory.218 Still, state court experiments are eA"tolled and
sometimes emulated.219 Furthermore, the emphasis is on uniform-
ity in federal law, not uniformity in general. The independent and
adequate state ground doctrine itself contemplates a disharmony
of state law. The power of imposing a minimal harmony over fed-
eral law is more an in terrorem device than a doctrine of actual
practice. The Court's power of review keeps state courts on key.220
While the supremacy clause is constitutional basis enough for this
"7 P. CARRINGTON, supra note 185, at 209.
The problem of national uniformity derives from a weakness in the federal appellate
hierarchy. The weakness is the result of overgrowth: the hegemony of the Supreme
Court of the United States is too attenuated to be effective as the unifying arch of the
structure. By combined force of numbers of cases and complexity, the IUltional law
has outgrown the Court's supervisory capacities. The Court is forced to scan many of
the matters for which it bears the ultimate responsibility.
Id.
"8 E.g., Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 376 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring) ("imagina-
tion unimpended by unwarranted demands for national uniformity is of special importance
at a time when serious doubt exists as to the adequacy of our criminal justice system.");
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 171-72 (1970) (Burger, C.J., concurring) ("The circum-
stances of this case demonstrate again that neither the Constitution as originally drafted,
nor any amendment, nor indeed any need, dictates that we must have absolute uniformity
in the criminal law in all the States."); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 133 (l970) (Harlan,
J. concurring and dissenting) ("one of [our national government's] basic virtues is to leave
ample room for governmental and social experimentation in a society as diverse £IS ours.");
see also supra note 148.
• ,8 E.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 27 n.1 (1972); id. at 57 n.21, 59·61 (Powell, J.,
concurring in result); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 134-43 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring
and dissenting).
"0 Justice Holmes once wrote: "I do not think the United States would come to an end if
we lost our power to declare an Act of Congress void. 1 do think the Union would be imper-
iled if we could not make that declaration as to the laws of the several states." O.W.
HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 295-96 (1920). See generally Sager, supra note 56, at
1250-53 (nonuniformity as a possible result of state courts being allowed to expand the ap-
plication of federally underenforced constitutional norms).
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as an ideal, common sense admits the concept is precatory.221
Considering the independent and adequate state ground doc-
trine as a prudential approach to the Court's discretionary jurisdic-
tion highlights the true nature of uniformity as a policy not pur-
sued to the extreme. The same need for uniformity in federal law
is present in a state court decision of a federal question which also
includes a state law ground. Yet, the Court will decline the oppor-
tunity to unify federal law when the state ground is independent
and adequate. Federalism's diversity overtakes uniformity. The
Long methodology has the potential to achieve greater uniformity
without sacrificing any diversity. Ambiguously grounded decisions
serve as vehicles to achieve some further measure of uniformity.
State courts may invoke the rule of plain statement and maintain
diversity. Thus, the rule preserves the federal plan of sufficient
uniformity and protected diversity.
The Supreme Court's experience with the Long rule is not yet
sufficient to make any more than preliminary observations about
the effect on the Court's institutional role vis-a.-vis the state courts.
The question posed by the ambiguously grounded decision remains
the same: to review or not to review. The answer continues to de-
pend on the Court's tolerance for ambiguity, a threshold admit-
tedly established very minimally in Long. Under the methodology
for ascertainment and disposition announced there, the more am-
biguous the state judgment is, the more likely it will be reviewed.
Now a state court opinion that simply includes some analysis of
the state constitution is not enough to ward off the Supreme
Court. The state decision clearly and expressly must be based on
state law exclusively, or if as an alternative to a federal holding,
on "bona fide separate, adequate, and independent [state]
grounds."222 The Court has not escaped the problem of ambiguity
because the prudential doctrine properly obliges the Court to de-
cide if the proper predicate of independence and adequacy exists
to decline review.
221 See Schleuter, supra note 55, at 1099.
To permit each state to interpret federal law in its own terms and to the extent it
deems worthwhile would simply open the doors to judicial balkanization; respecting a
state's autonomy is a worthwhile goal, but usurping the Supreme Court's prerogative
to serve as the final arbiter of federal constitutional law is an unacceptable cost.
[d•
••• Long, 463 U.S. at 1041.
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Preliminary experience discloses that the Supreme Court strictly
adheres to the Long methodology for ascertainment and disposi-
tion.223 At the ascertainment level, the Long doctrine and its appli-
cation connote a lesser tolerance for ambiguity requiring increased
explicitness of state courts relying on state law to insulate the
judgment from Supreme Court review.224 The new disposition
methodology amounts to an effective presumption favoring Su-
preme Court review,2211 although clarification may be sought.22fJ
Some factors which helped buttress the pre-Long determination to
review227 continue to be relevant under the new approach. These
factors include the failure to cite a state constitutional provision or
decision,228 the extended analysis of the Constitution without sepa-
rating state constitutional analysis,229 the use of precedents that
are premised on federal authority,230 and the absence of a plain
223 See, e.g., Caldwell v. Mississippi, 105 S. Ct. 2633, 2638-39 (1985); Ake v. Oklahoma,
105 S. Ct. 1087, 1092-93 (1985): Uhler v. AFL-CIO, 105 S. Ct. 5, 6 (Rehnquist, Circuit Jus-
tice 1984): Oliver v_ United States, 104 S. Ct. 1735, 1739 0.5 (1984); Colorado v. Nunez, 104
S. Ct. 1257, 1258 (1984) (White, J., concurring in writ dismissnl).
It is noteworthy that the Long rule is viewed as 50 well established that the Court hD.s
applied it to the procedural part of the independent and adequate state ground doctrine.
See Caldwell v. Mississippi, 105 S. Ct. 2633, 2638-39 (1985); Ake v. Oklahoma, 105 S. Ct.
1087,1092-93 (1985): ct- Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Engineering, 104 S. Ct. 2267, 2'J:17
(1984) (analogy to state jurisdiction).
22. See, e.g., Caldwell v. Mississippi, 105 S. Ct. 2633, 2639 (1985); California v. Carney,
105 S. Ct. 2066, 2068 n.l (1985): Florida v. Meyers, 104 S. Ct. 1852, 1853 n.· (1984); Califor-
nia v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 997 n.7 (1983).
= See, e.g., Florida v. Meyers, 104 S. Ct. 1852, 1853 n.· (1984); Oliver v. United States,
104 S. Ct. 1735, 1739 n.5 (1984); Colorado v. Nunez, 104 S. Ct. 1257,1258 (1984) (White, J.,
concurring): California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 997 n.7 (1983).
The Court seems to have suggested that the requirement of a plain statement imposed by
Long in ambiguously based decisions may extend to decisions based on state law. See Mey-
ers, 104 S. Ct. at 1854 n.l (Stevens, J., dissenting). In any event, the Court hD.s made it very
clear that its reading of the state opinion will controL California v. Carney, 105 S. Ct. 2066,
2068 n.7: see also Welsh, supra note 62, at 848.
226 See supra note 78.
227 See generally Bamberger, supra note 79, at 306-07.
226 See, e.g., Colorado v. Nunez, 104 S. Ct. 1257, 1258 (1984) (White, J., concurring); Dela-
ware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979).
229 See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Upton, 104 S. Ct. 2085, 2089-90 (1984) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring): South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 560 (1983).
Justice Stevens used the bully pulpit of the reporter to chastise the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts for "rest[ing] its decision on the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution without telling us whether the warrant was valid as a matter of Massa-
chusetts law." Upton, 104 S. Ct. at 2085, 2089 (Stevens, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
230 See, e.g., Ohio v. Johnson, 104 S. Ct. 2536, 2540 n.7 (1984); Oliver v. United States, 104
S. Ct. 1735, 1739 n.5 (1984): Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667,671 (1982).
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statement of independence which explains any federal reliance as
independent and merely persuasive.231 This last factor has emerged
as the controlling feature of the Supreme Court's ascertainment of
ambiguity.232 The Court's lowered tolerance for ambiguity, coupled
with the uniform disposition of review if there is doubt about the
state ground, has enlarged the Court's power of review over state
courts in theory and in fact.233
The methodology of Michigan v. Long presents something of a
paradox when considered in the context of other recent doctrinal
developments in federal jurisdiction. The contemporary Supreme
Court has invoked federalism-some would say with a vengeance,
others would say with a vision-to restrict general access to the
federal courts. Yet, as we have seen, the Long methodology in the-
ory and in fact increases the power of review of the Supreme Court
over state supreme courts. Exploring this paradox offers one last
vantage on the doctrine.
The theme of this recrudescent federalism is that the state
courts are the primary guardians of individual rights. Noting a few
examples of recent limits on access to federal courts makes my
point. During the mid-1970's, the prior trend toward broadening
standing doctrine came to an end and since then there have been
suggestions of a pullback.234 The doctrine of "Our Federalism," or
Younger abstention,235 requires that "[b]ased on considerations of
231 See, e.g., Caldwell v. Mississippi, 105 S. Ct. 2633, 2639 (1985); New York v. Quarles,
104 S. Ct. 2626, 2637 n.2 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Ohio v. Johnson, 104 S. Ct. 2536, 2540 n.7 (1984); Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040·42 (1983).
232 See, e.g., Caldwell v. Mississippi, 105 S. Ct. 2633, 2639 (1985); New York v. Quarles.
104 S. Ct. 2626, 2637 n.2 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Ohio v. Johnson, 104 S. Ct. 2536, 2540 n.7 (1984); Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040 (1983); sec also
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 5, § 4032, at 441 (Supp. 1983).
233 See, e.g., Ake v. Oklahoma, 105 S. Ct. 1087, 1093 (1985); Ohio v. Johnson, 104 S. Ct.
2536, 2540 n.7 (1984); id. at 2543 n.* (Stevens, J. dissenting); Florida v. Meyers. 104 S. Ct.
1852, 1853 n.* (1984); Colorado v. Nunez, 104 S. Ct. 1257, 1259 (1984) (Stevens. J., concur·
ring); California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1031 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Bam-
berger, supra note 79, at 296.
23. C. WRIGHT, supra note 2, § 13, at 67·74. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Lyons. 461
U.S. 95 (1983); Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982). See generally Nichol, Backing into the Fu·
ture: The Burger Court and the Federal Forum, 30 U. RAN. L. REV. 341, 345·50 (1982)
(overview of that trend in the Burger Court).
230 The doctrine may be traced to a 1971 decision and its sequelae. See, e.g., Trainor v.
Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977); Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975); Steffel v.
Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
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equity, comity, and federalism, a federal district court must ab-
stain from granting either declaratory or injunctive relief when a
state criminal action or its equivalent is pending against the fed-
eral plaintiff."236 Similarly based procedural restrictions have been
placed on the federal habeas corpus jurisdiction over state
prisoners.237
Consider the postconviction procedures open to the convicted
state defendant:
Today a criminal defendant typically can take six steps af-
ter a conviction in the state courts. (1) he may seek review by
the state's appellate court (if there is an intermediate appel-
late court, there may be a two-stage appellate process), and
(2) he may follow postconviction procedures in the state court
that provide a basis for entry into the federal courts. Next, (3)
the defendant can petition for a writ of certiorari or a direct
appeal to the United States Supreme Court. If access to the
United States Supreme Court is denied, as is most often the
case, (4) the defendant then, by filing a petition for writ of
habeas corpus, may go to the federal district court. If denied
relief there, (5) he may appeal to the United States circuit
court of appeals, and if he loses there, (6) he may go back
again to the United States Supreme Court, this time from the
decision of the court of appeals.238
This sequence provides a procedural context for the independent
and adequate state ground doctrine and poses the paradox be-
tween Long and recent habeas decisions. Over the years, the
Court's manipulation of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction exem-
plifies the duality of federalism, alternating between exalting the
federal and the state forum.239 In recent years, the Court has cho-
236 Baker, supra note 90, at 176-77. See generally Nichol, supra note 234, at 350·56 (ex-
amining the Younger doctrine).
237 Non-jurisdictional, substantive limits have narrowed the federal court role, os well, in
such areas as procedural due process, state action, and the eleventh amendment. See, e.g.,
Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 104 S. Ct. 900 (1984) (eleventh amend-
ment); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983) (procedural due process); Rendell-Baker v.
Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982) (state action); see also Seid, supra note 45, at 52·62; Wisdom,
supra note 118, at 1072-78.
236 Cameron, supra note 138, at 554. The procedures are mapped in Meyer & Ynck1e,
Collateral Challenges to Criminal Convictions, 21 U. KAN. 1.. REv. 259, 275 (1973).
239 Compare Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 406-26 (1963) (federal relief authorized unless
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sen the latter course.240 The exhaustion doctrine, requiring the
state prisoner to have had presented the substance of the federal
claim to the state court as a condition of federal relief, has received
new emphasis.241 State procedural defaults have been afforded con·
trolling significance in the federal postconviction process.242 State
court findings have been accorded a presumption of correctness.243
Finally, the Court has held that if the state court "has provided an
opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment
claim, a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus
relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional
search or seizure was introduced at his trial."244 At each phase, the
Court has reduced the jurisdiction of federal courts to reconsider
state criminal convictions. The independent and adequate state
ground doctrine, with the effect of enlarging the Court's review of
state criminal convictions, seems contrary.24G
The origin of this paradox lies in the nature of the doctrine, in
the ambiguity of our federalism. The explanation was suggested in
Justice Stevens' view of the Court's role. Justice Stevens took the
low road of solitary dissent in Long.246 He agreed that the ad hoc
there was a "deliberate bypass" of state procedural requirements) with Wainwright v.
Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 78-85 (1977) (federal relief not authorized unless state prisoner demon·
strates "cause and prejudice"). See generally Guttenberg, Federal Habeas Corpus, Consti-
tutional Rights, and Procedural Forfeitures: The Delicate Balance, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV.
617 (1984) (broad overview).
"0 See generally McMillian, Habeas Corpus and the Burger Court, 28 ST. LoUIS U.L.J. 11
(1984) (examining the Court's recent decisions in habeas corpus proceedings).
•• , See Anderson v. Harlass, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982); see also Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509,
518-19 (1982) (requiring dismissal of state prisoner's petition containing exhausted and
unexhausted claims); Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 (1981) (ineffective assistance of
counsel claim must be exhausted).
... A state prisoner barred by a procedural default from raising a constitutional claim in
state court may not litigate the claim on federal habeas consideration without demonstrat-
ing some cause for and actual prejudice from the default. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 110
(1982); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977).
• 43 Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 432 (1983); Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 592·93
(1982).
... Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976) (footnote omitted). See generally Halpern,
Federal Habeas Corpus and the Mapp Exclusionary Rule After Stone v. Powell, 82 COLUM.
L. REV. 1 (1982).
••• The paradox cuts across the substantive and procedural halves of the adequate and
independent state ground doctrine. Cf. supra note 223 (equating two halves of the doctrine
under Long methodology). See generally Hill, supra note 24•
••• Long, 463 U.S. at 1065 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens' tenure has been char·
acterized by a running commentary on the Court's institutional behavior. See R. Collins,
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approach was unsatisfactory and that a presumptive disposition
was appropriate in the decisions ascertained to be ambiguously
groUnded; however, his presumption would have the Court refuse
review in ambiguously grounded decisions as if the decision was
state law grounded.247 In his conception of the Court's relationship
with the state courts, Justice Stevens concluded "the primary role
of this Court is to make sure that persons who seek to vindicate
federal rights have been fairly heard."248 This concept of role
would oblige the Court to rationalize the discretionary power over
the docket, as I have struggled to do, within our dual court sys-
tem.249 In a later dissent Justice Stevens elaborated upon this
theme to suggest an absolute rule against review when a state court
has upheld a claim of a federal right unless a significant conflict
existed or the Court selected the case to make a major pronounce-
ment of federallaw.2t10 A corollary to this theme emerged in Justice
Stevens' Long dissent. He observed a pronounced tendency for the
Court to review and reverse state court civil liberties d~cisions
holding that the state court had interpreted the Constitution too
expansively.2t11 He traced the history of this tendency back to the
State Constitutional Law-Justice Stevens Becomes an Advocate of States' Role in the
High Court, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 27, 1984, at 20, coL 1.; L. Greenhouse, Working Profile: Justice
John Paul Stevens-In the Matter of Labels, a Loner, N.Y. Times, July 23,1984, at AS, coL
3; see also Stevens, Some Thoughts on Judicial Restraint, 66 JUDICATURE 177 (1982).
247 Long, 463 U.S. at 1067-72. His initial reading of the precedents revealed that this pre-
sumption was established in the adequate and independent state ground doctrine's stare
decisis. Id. at 1067.
2•• Id. at 1068. This view of role is neither original to Michigan v. Long nor limited to
Justice Stevens. See Ponte v. Real, 105 S. Ct. 2192, 2198 n.3 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring);
id. at 2209 n. 21 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.s.
456, 479 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 726 (1975) (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
2•• See note, supra note 100, at 230.
Justice Stevens' position is provocative precisely because it represents a tentative step to-
ward a conception of Supreme Court review that looks squarely to the federal interests im-
plicated and discards reliance on the formal basis of a state court's decision. The challenge
that remains is to complete this move from formalism by developing criteria that the Court
can apply to determine when review is appropriate. Suitable criteria, while demarking the
conditions under which federal interests should be protected, would respect a state's auton-
omy to evolve a jurisprudence neither stifled by unreviewed misapprehensions of substan-
tive federal mandates nor confined- by a court's fear of unwarranted reversal-in the en-
deavor to use the full suggestive force of the growing resources of federal law.
Id.
uo California v. Carney, 105 S. Ct. 2066, 2072-74 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
201 Long, 463 U.S. at 1069-70 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Welsh, supra note 58, at
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mid-1970's when the independent and adequate state ground doc-
trine began to change toward the Long majority's approach.2G2
Rather than some individual's claim of deprivation of federal right,
these petitions ask for review on behalf of state officials who urge
reversal because, as the Court once explained in such a case, "a
State [court] may not impose such greater restrictions [on the
State] as a matter of federal constitutional law when this court
specifically refrains from imposing them."2G3 Justice Stevens thus
renewed his attack on the certiorari practices of the Court, chal-
lenging that "the Court is more interested in upholding the power
of the State than in vindicating individual rights."2G4 Finally, he
accused the Court of "grant[ing] prosecutors relief from [state
court] suppression orders with distressing regularity."2GG These
views apparently reflect a larger theory of the Court and its rela-
tionship to the states. Justice Stevens seems to have endorsed the
managerial theory of the Supreme Court's role put forward by the
New York University Supreme Court Project.2G6 That metaphor of
1119.
••• Long, 463 U.S. at 1069-70 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Zacchini v. Scripps.Howard
Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977»; see supra note 81; see also Elison & NettikSimmon,
supra note 39, at 182-95 (tracing the development of Supreme Court review)•
••• Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975); see supra notes 142-81 and accompanying
text.
... Idaho Dep't of Employment v. Smith, 434 U.S. 100, 104-05 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissent·
ing); see also Colorado v. Nunez, 104 S. Ct. 1257, 1259 (1984) (Stevens, J. concurring)•
••• New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733, 761 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote
omitted). Justice Stevens listed 23 examples since the October Term 1982. [d. at 761 n.12.
Michigan v. Long, was such a search and seizure case. See supra note 66. Justices Stevens
and Marshall have made this point elsewhere arguing against grant of certiorari. See Ponte
v. Real, 105 S. Ct. 2192, 2199 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 2209 n.21 (Marshall, J.
dissenting); Florida v. Meyer, 104 S. Ct. 1852, 1855 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting)•
••• Justice Stevens cited and quoted the Executive Summary of the Report with approval
in California v. Carney, 105 S. Ct. 2066, 2073 n. 8 (1985).
Justice Stevens' view of the relationship includes an important role for state courts:
The maintenance of the proper balance between the respective jurisdictions of
state and federal courts is always a difficult task. In recent years I have been con·
cerned by what I have regarded as an encroachment by this Court into territory that
should be reserved for state judges. The maintenance of this balance is, however, a
two way street. It is also important that state judges do not unnecessarily invite this
Court to undertake review of state court judgments. I believe the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts unwisely and unnecessarily invited just such review in this
case [by refusing to consider a parallel state constitutional argument]. Its judgment
in this regard reflects a misconception of our constitutional heritage and the respec-
tive jurisdictions of state and federal courts.
Massachusetts v. Upton, 104 S. Ct. 2085, 2090 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring) (citations
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role likens the Court to a manager marshalling scarce judicial re-
sources, who "should intervene only when a binding, authoritative
decision is truly demanded."257 The ascertainment and disposition
methodology announced in Long went beyond Justice Stevens'
self-restrained, narrow view of role.
On this level of role and doctrinal context, Michigan v. Long
may best be understood. I have several parries to the twin thrusts
that the Court's discretionary docket should never be used to re-
view state court judgments that uphold a claim of federal right and
that the present Court's exercise of this discretion improperly fa-
vors prosecutors, especially in search and seizure suppression
cases.258
First, Justice Stevens offers no recent authority for his narrow
view of the Court's role on review as solely to vindicate denied fed-
eral rights. To reason from the general importance of that role to
conclude it is exclusive goes beyond precedent and logic.2llB
Second, Justice Stevens' view would leave no room for the
Court's constructive inquiry under its statutory jurisdiction. His
rationale would not be restricted only to state decisions which are
arguably supported by adequate and independent state grounds.
Apparently, Justice Stevens believes that even if the decision rests
exclusively on federal grounds the Court should not review judg-
ments if the federal right was upheld.260 The Long majority's anal-
ysis properly defers to the decision clearly grounded on state law
because Supreme Court review cannot change the outcome when
the individual right will be upheld independently.261 But the am-
omitted); see also supra notes 142-81 and accompanying text.
'57 Estreicher & Sexton, New York University Supreme Court Project, Executive Sum-
mary 15 (1985). That Executive Report described the managerial approach further:
Absent relatively rare justifications for immediate intervention, the Court as manager
should accord a presumption of regularity or validity to the decisions of lower courts
and should defer articulation of binding national law until all of the issues ha\'e been
sufficiently ventilated after a period of percolation in the state and lower federal
courts.
Id.; see also Developments in the Law: The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights,
95 HARv. L. REv. 1342-47 (1982) (suggesting review only on a clear absence of an indepen-
dent state ground).
• 58 See Schleuter, supra note 55, at 1093-98-
u. Id. at 1093 n.86.
••• Long, 463 U.S. at 1043 n.8; see supra notes 110-41 and accompanying text.
.61 See Sandalow, supra note 33, at 199; see also supra notes 142-81 and accompanying
text.
HeinOnline -- 19 Ga. L. Rev. 854 1984-1985
854 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:799
biguously grounded decision may amount to a federally grounded
decision. Today, it seems "elemental" that an exclusively federally
grounded state decision should be subject to Supreme Court review
whether the state decision upheld or denied the federal claim.202
Congress changed the Court's jurisdictional statute to accomplish
that very thing in 1914.263
I am not sure how Justice Stevens proposes to rollback the 1914
statutory amendment, although I suppose that the Court could get
away with it, as the Court has succeeded in downgrading appeals
under the mandatory review statute to discretionary review. The
question is should the Court try to get away with it. I think not,
for a third reason. Lost in such a per se approach would be impor-
tant federal interests in error correction, institutional leadership,
and uniformity. These features of the Court's role are too valuable
to forsake once and for all. Justice Stevens' clever invocation of
sovereignty, in which he likens the Court's relationship with state
courts to the Court's relationship with the courts of a foreign coun-
try, is inappropriate.264 Our federalist structure and our constitu-
tional theory belie the comparison between the independent and
adequate state ground theory and the Court's role vis-a-vis the
courts in the Republic of Finland.
Fourth, Justice Stevens has not convinced me that the Long
methodology will necessarily result in dramatic increases in the de-
mand on scarce Court resources. Indeed, the opposite effect might
result. As state courts and litigants become more savvy, holdings
expanding individual liberties will be anchored in state constitu-
tional law and insulated from Supreme Court review by the clear
statement of a state law ground. This reliance on state constitu-
tional law may result in fewer review applications on the Court's
.6' HART & WECHSLER, supra note 2, at 122-23 (Supp. 1981)•
• 63 Originally, the Court's jurisdiction was limited as Justice Stevens would limit it to-
day: Supreme Court review of state decisions was permitted only when the federal claim
had been denied. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85-87 (current version at 28
U.S.C. § 1257 (1983». As a response to state court decisions expanding the federal due
process, Congress added jurisdiction over state cases sustaining a federal claim. Sec F.
FRANKFURTER & L. LANDIS, supra note 212, at 188-98. That remains the law today. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1257 (3) (1983). See also WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 5, § 4006, at 545.
Justice Stevens surely is aware of the 1914 amendment, yet seems to have conveniently
overlooked the statutory implication for his theory. See Stevens, The Life Span of a Judge-
Made Rule, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 11 n.54 (1983).
.... Long, 463 U.S. at 1072 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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discretionary docket. More important, the state courts will be per-
forming their constitutional role in our federalism.20G All signs indi-
cate they are capable of operating within this clarified role.20o I
have difficultly understanding the "threat" behind a doctrine
which has such an effect.
Fifth, to my mind, Stone v. Powell207 explains much about the
new methodology in Long and the present Court's seeming
penchant for state court search and seizure decisions. The effect of
Stone was to narrow federal overview of incorporated fourth
amendment claims to the exclusive province of the Supreme
Court.208 Sheer numbers account for some of the search and seizure
increase on the Court's docket.209 Long itself was a search and
seizure decision.270 The Long methodology of ascertainment and
disposition furthers the Court's effectiveness at overseeing the
state supreme courts. Some of the recent substantive upheavals in
search and seizure doctrine further support the need for the Long
methodology and the inevitability of the Court's docket emphasis
in search and seizure.271 Wholesale changes in substantive doctrine
necessitate some Supreme Court policing. Revamping the indepen-
dent and adequate state ground doctrine allowed the Court greater
••• Collins, supra note 58, at 94; Schleuter, supra note 55, at 1098.
.... See supra notes 175-81.
'67 428 U.S. 465 (1976); see supra note 244.
... Then Judge (now Justice) O'Connor, the author of the Long majority opinion. made
the point previously:
In the next decade, there will probably be significant additionol state court varia-
tions in cases involving the issue of illegal search and seizure under the fourth
amendment. Since Stone v. Powell, state criminal defendants who have had a "full
and fair opportunity" to raise their claims of illegal search and seizure in the state
courts may not, thereafter, obtain federal habeas corpus relief. We do not yet know
the tests to be employed in determing what is a "full and fair opportunity." However.
assuming the state courts are providing a full and fair opportunity for the claims to
be raised, and that federal habeas corpus review is unavailable, the state courts are
more likely than their federal counterparts to reach widely varying results on search
and seizure issues. Even the federal cases on search and seizure are not models of
clarity and simplicity. The standards tend to be confusing and obtuse in some
instances.
O'Connor, supra note 139, at 804 (footnotes omitted).
••• See Long, 463 U.S. at 1043 n.8.
270 See supra note 66.
271 See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Sheppard. 104 S. Ct. 3424 (1984) (good faith exception);
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (warrant procedure); Raka.s v. Illinois, 439 US. 128
(1978) (standing); see also Hellman. supra note 116. at 530-49; Seid. supra note 45. at 19.
58.
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review capability to this end.272 Given the large number of cases in
the Supreme Court pipeline, the diminished role of the lower fed-
eral courts, and the Court's change of direction in doctrine, the
new methodology fits in nicely. The doctrine is shaped by the ten-
sions sought to be accommodated. The adequate and independent
state ground doctrine of an expansionist incorporation era was not
compatible with the present Court's direction or sense of purpose.
My last reason to disagree with Justice Stevens' criticism is also
my best reason. His frustration with the Court's granting review of
federal questions on state prosecutors' petitions and reversing state
court judgments entered on behalf of defendants seems to suggest
that there is something wrong with the practice. I do not agree. I
do not believe that the Court should decide in favor of the criminal
defendant or not at all. Justice Stevens' avenue to Court review is
one-way. Mine is a middle road on which travel in both directions
is proper.273
Consider the constitutional theory. Justice Rehnquist has ex-
plained that the objects of this jurisdiction, the provisions in the
Bill of Rights, "simply represent decisions on the part of the ex-
'7' See G. GUNTHER. supra note 46, at 58; Collins, supra note 58, at 92.
'7' I shall allow Judge Aldisert to defend me on the charge of breaking ranks with the
intelligentsia:
Judging constitutional law cases is made difficult because the predominant aca-
demic literature applauds only dogma that extends individual rights and liberties. A
court decision that comes down with no such extension or comes down flatly in favor
of society against an individual either receives no kudos or becomes the subject of
vehement criticism. I recognize fully that one institutional role of the courts is to
interpose themselves between the individual and the brute force of the majority, but I
am not at all certain that judges should be worshipped for deciding in favor of the
individual in every case. Judges who do so are advocates and not judges. The nature
of today's legal climate is that both the professional and the lay public pick up sides
in constitutional adjudication, assigning the name "liberal" or "conservative"
(whatever these mean in terms of today's convoluted issues implicating competing
individual, public, and social interests) to each judge. They are wont to criticize
judges who decide one way in one case, another way in another, and to describe them
as "swing" or "wishy washy" or "inconsistent." They seemingly forget that the appel-
late judge's task is to decide the particular case on the particular record and the
particular issues raised by the particular adversaries. At one time, a judge with
preconceived notions, unreceptive to arguments before him, was considered a bad
judge. Now he or she is a bad judge only if he or she does not thrust, at every turn,
regardless of the record presented, the federal court into new facets of the daily lives
of state and local agencies or private individuals.
Aldisert, State Courts and Federalism in the 1980's: Comment, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV.
821, 831-32 (1981) (footnotes omitted). Ct. supra note 256 (quoting Justice Stevens).
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traordinary majority required to amend the United States Consti-
tution to remove from the authority of temporary majorities who
may be in control . . . the authority to take action forbidden by
the amendment in question."274 That is all. Certainly that is
enough. Behind Justice Stevens' criticism is a common but inade-
quate way of thinking about government and individuals solely as
opponents in some criminal justice sporting event. Justice Brennan
reminded us recently that "[t]he government is charged with pro-
tecting the privacy and security of the citizen, just as it is charged
with apprehending those who violate the criminallaw."2711 Both re-
sponsibilities are for the government; a view toward one without
the other is incomplete. Justice Stevens' approach to the role of
the Court, which says only the criminal defendant can gain review,
furthers the :first half of Justice Brennan's definition but tellingly
ignores the second half. In his John A. Sibley Lecture, reprinted in
the pages of this Review last year, Solicitor General Lee defended
the Court from attacks such as Justice Stevens' Long dissent com-
plaining that the present Court majority favors the government
over the individual:
What is wrong is that this characterization-government
versus the individual-tells only part of the story.
[The 1983 Supreme Court Term] criminal cases illustrate
the point. Why is it that governments are on the opposite side
of the [criminal defendants] of this world? This answer is ob-
vious. It is not because governments have some inevitable and
..,. Rehnquist, Government by Cliche: Keynote Address of the Earl F. Nelson Lecture
Series, 45 Mo. L. REv. 379, 389-90 (1980) (footnote omitted). See Choper, Consequences of
Supreme Court Decisions Upholding Individual Constitutional Rights, 83 MICIL L. REv. I,
107-38 (1985) (rights of accused and law-abiding); see also supra notes 142-181nnd accom-
panying text.
..,. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733, 755 n. 5 (1985) (Brennnn, J., dissenting). Justice
Brennan was faulting the majority for thinking about only one part of the government's
responsibility:
I speak of the "government's side" only because it is the terminology used by the
Court. In my view, this terminology itself is seriously misleading. The government is
charged with protecting the privacy and security of the citizen, just as it is charged
with apprehending those who violate the criminal law. Consequently, the government
has no legitimate interest in conducting a search that unduly intrudes on the privacy
and security of the citizen. The balance is not between the rights of the government
and the rights of the citi2en, but between opposing conceptions of the constitutionally
legitimate means of carrying out the government's varied responsibilities.
Id.
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mysterious compulsion always to oppose individuals. It is that
one of government's jobs is to keep its citizens as free as it can
from the depredations of which these [criminal defendants]
were accused: drug dealing, murder, and rape. The "govern-
mental interest" in preventing crime is really derivative. It is
not asserted on behalf of some impersonal, unidentifiable, bu-
reaucratic nonentity. It is a people interest, an individual in-
terest. The individuals affected are larger in number than the
criminally accused, but they are nonetheless individu-
als-individuals whose interest is in the security of their per-
sons, their property, and their homes.276
This is not new; Justice Stevens' point of view is new. The position
of the individual as the focal point of judicial concern did not
emerge in this country until after the Second World War. The con-
stitutionalization of state criminal procedures occurred during the
last twenty-five years. Today the Court reflects a societal balance
missing in the judicial period before and during the fever pitch of
the incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the fourteenth amend-
ment due process clause.277 I do not mean to suggest that the indi-
vidual always should lose; that would make me guilty of the same
error Justice Stevens commits. My preference is for a balance, for
taking the measure of the tension and adjusting our federalism.
Federal interests in error correction, coherence of doctrine, and
uniformity outweigh Justice Stevens' argument that it is somehow
a prudent exercise of the Court's power to insulate a state court
ruling against a state prosecutor on a federal question simply by
noting that the action benefited the state defendant. Indeed, he
would take away all opportunities to affirm a judgment in favor of
a federal claim. Ignoring neutral principles, Justice Stevens' real
problem is that, on the merits, the sides have changed.278 Instead
of reversing state court judgments because they fall below the fed-
eral minimum, the present Court reverses state court judgments on
..8 Lee, The Supreme Court's 1983 Term: Individual Rights, Freedom, and the Statue
of Liberty, 19 GA. L. REV. I, 2-3 (1984); see also Stone, a.T. 1983 and the Era of Aggressive
Majoritarianism: A Court in Transition, 19 GA. L. REV. 15, 19 (1984).
'77 Chief Justice Burger has become an ardent spokesman for the broader view of individ-
ual rights that includes the law-abiding. See, e.g., United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499,
507 (1983); Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. I, 14-15 (1983).
• 78 See supra note 160.
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the federal merits for affording too much protection.219 As a neu-
tral principle, the ascertainment and disposition methodology an-
nounced in Michigan v. Long allows both approaches to the merits.
In that regard, nothing has changed.
IV. CONCLUSION
As we have seen, the independent and adequate state ground
doctrine is something of a synecdoche for federal jurisdiction, fed-
eralism, constitutional theory, and institutional role. This is be-
cause the doctrine deals with the appellate jurisdiction of the Su-
preme Court, what one of its best students once called "a great
national achievement."280 Until Michigan v. Long, the doctrine had
been an ad hoc process of uncertain dimension in the ambiguously
grounded state court decision. The Court seemed content to aban-
don the doctrine "in an undeveloped, unrationalized, and uncer-
tain state."281 The Long methodology for ascertainment and dispo-
sition of the ambiguously grounded state decision is significant as
an all too rare occasion of rationalizing Supreme Court procedure,
but it is more. The methodology represents the latest adjustment
in the tension between the power of the Court to revise state court
judgments on federal questions and the sovereign power of state
courts over state law questions. The issue is not which will have
the last word, for each does in its appropriate province. The issue
is what procedure in ambiguously grounded decisions will best en-
sure that each court fulfills its constitutional function. We have an
answer, for where we are now on the Mobius strip of our
federalism.
..,9 Welsh, supra note 62, at 820.
%80 Wechsler, supra note 24, at 1064. Professor Wechsler introduced his topic by
explaining:
My subject, as you know, concerns the jurisdiction of our highest court, the tribu-
nal that is certainly without an analogue throughout the world in the magnitude of its
responsibilities, measured by the difficulty and importance of the issues it confronts,
the finality of many of its most transforming judgments short of constitutionnl
amendment, the number of judicial systems from which cases on its docket may de.
rive and the complexity of the mixed legal system in the ordering of which it has the
final voice.
Id. at 1043.
%81 Field, supra note 113, at 721.
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